as, it was apprehended, invasion by us would unite all the people of the North
, Democrats and Republicans, in the defense of their country.
It is certain that either country could have raised armies stronger, both in numbers and in spirit, for defensive than for offensive war.
The President could have expected no “different use of victory,” because he1
knew that I thought that the next important service of that army would be near the end of October, against the invasion of a much greater Federal army than McDowell
's; and he proposed, the day after the battle, to send me, with a part of the army at Manassas
, to Western Virginia
Our own dead were buried without unnecessary delay; but the expectation on our part that General McDowell
would send a party of his own soldiers to perform that duty to their late comrades
, left the Federal
dead unburied several days, until we found it necessary to inter them.
After the troops had been somewhat reorganized, new positions were assigned to them.
Among the charges against me, is that of exposing the army at the same time to the stench of the battle-field,2
and the miasma of the August heat, and thus producing “camp-fevers tenfold more fatal than the bullets of the enemy.”
Those who have seen large bodies of new troops know that they are sickly in all climates.
Our Southern volunteers were peculiarly so, being attacked in the early part of their camp-life by measles and