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Chapter 11: military operations.
- What was ordered
-- Mobile of no consequence
-- Baton Rouge seized
-- Farragut and Williams advance upon Vicksburg
-- Halleck asked for aid
-- he refuses
-- some strictures on his conduct
-- digging the Canal at Vicksburg
-- fall in the River
-- French vessel before New Orleans
-- an international episode: France to recognize the Confederacy, liberate New Orleans, be given Texas and capture Mexico
-- Butler meets the emergency
-- the forts strengthened
-- justification found for firing on a French flat
-- the loyal and disloyal citizens put on record
-- all arms ordered given up
-- Porter's bombardment of Vicksburg
-- battle of Baton Rouge
-- Admiral Porter's brother
-- “lying is a family Vice ”
-- General Phelps' resignation
-- General strong at Pontchatoula
-- Louis Napoleon again
-- Admiral Reynaud at New Orleans
-- negro regiments organized
-- Weitzel's expedition
-- his objection to negro soldiers answered
-- Twelfth Maine at Manchac pass
The question must have arisen in the mind of the reader, in poring over the administration of these many civil affairs: Were military operations delayed while these things were being done?
By no means.
Farragut and myself were ordered to do two things, if we could; first, to open the
Mississippi River; second, to capture
Mobile.
Now, the capture of
Mobile was of no earthly military consequence to anybody.
It was like the attempted capture of
Savannah,
Port Royal,
Fernandina,
Brunswick, and
Charleston, in which places the lives of so many good men were sacrificed.
These places could all have been held by a few vessels under the command of vigilant, energetic, and ambitious young naval officers.
The absolute inability of the
Confederacy to have a navy or any force on the sea, ought to have suggested to us a militia navy for coast protection and defence.
Then there could have been an early concentration of our troops into large armies for the purpose of instruction and discipline; and as almost every part of the
Confederacy was penetrable to a greater or less degree by means of rivers, our armies should have marched by water to a very much greater extent than they did. Now, the great water communication of the whole
West, through the
Mississippi, was to be opened to the sea at all hazards.
New Orleans was now invincible to any land force so long as our navy occupied the river and
Lake Pontchartrain, and so long as the city was held by five thousand men who had nothing else to do. A single ten-gun sloop off Manchac Pass rendered it impossible for the city to
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be taken by land so long as
Lake Pontchartrain was held by our light-draught gunboats.
Therefore, it was agreed between the admiral and myself that with his main fleet he should go up the river as far as he could, and that I should give him the troops needed to occupy the places that he could take with his fleet.
Thereupon he left directly, and seized
Baton Rouge.
Here we left some two thousand men, more because it was a healthy location than for any particular military usefulness.
We concluded to make no fortification there.
Farragut passed
Port Hudson, where there were at that time no considerable defences.
He had determined to look upon
Vicksburg as the only place where a fortified stronghold was substantially possible for the protection of the surrounding country.
The fleet accordingly went on.
We at once agreed — and
General Williams acquiesced upon observation — that the easier way of passing
Vicksburg was to make a short canal across the peninsula that faced the city and thus turn a current of water through this channel.
It was believed that such a canal would soon shorten the river, leaving
Vicksburg and its possible fortifications some three miles inland.
The project was undertaken, and it might have been successfully carried out had not a sudden fall of several feet in the height of the river rendered it impossible to dig the canal deep enough.
To capture by assault with
Williams' brigade was not practicable, and as
Vicksburg was found to be within the territorial lines of the department of
General Halleck, the admiral thought it was his duty and his right to at least ask
Halleck to furnish men enough to cooperate with the navy, and, in conjunction with
Williams, to make the attack.
Now, mark:
Vicksburg was the most important point in the country to be captured.
Farragut was above it with his fleet, having run by it. If
Halleck, when he moved from
Corinth, had sent any considerable force from
Corinth to the rear of
Vicksburg to cut off supplies,--as our fleets were both above and below the town — it might have been starved out in twenty days, as
Grant a year afterwards captured it by starvation of its forces, after he had lost many men in assaults, and from the unhealthiness of the region.
Ellet with his fleet had captured
Fort Pillow;
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and the river would have been opened from
St. Louis down to the sea, if
Halleck had complied with
Farragut's request.
This was
Farragut's letter:--
Sir:--I have the honor to inform you that I have passed the batteries and am now above
Vicksburg with the greatest part of my fleet.
I drove the men from the batteries, but they remained quiet till we passed, and then they up again and raked us. They have some eight regiments, or ten thousand troops, to replenish the batteries and prevent us from landing.
Brigadier-General Williams is acting in concert with me, but his force is too small to attempt to land on the
Vicksburg side, but he is cutting a ditch across the peninsula to change the course of the river.
My orders, General, are to
clear the river. This I find impossible without your assistance.
Can you aid me in this matter to carry out the peremptory order of the
President?
I am satisfied that you will act for the best advantage of the government in this matter, and shall therefore wait with great anxiety your reply.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ellet, who has kindly offered to co-operate with me in any way in his power, has also offered to send this despatch to you.
I remain, with respect, your obedient servant,
Stanton had already addressed
Halleck on the same subject on the 23d of June, and this communication, here given, must have reached
Halleck even before he received
Farragut's letter:--
[Telegram.]
If you have not already given your attention to the practicability of making a cut-off in the rear of
Vicksburg I beg to direct your attention to that point.
It has been represented to the Department to be an undertaking of easy accomplishment, especially under the protection of gunboats.
A despatch to-day received from
General Butler speaks of it as a project contemplated by him, but he may not have a force to spare.
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Halleck answered
Farragut's letter on the 3d of July as follows:--
The scattered and weakened condition of my forces renders it impossible for me at the present moment to detach any, to co-operate with you on
Vicksburg.
Probably I shall be able to do so as soon as I can get my troops more concentrated.
This may delay the clearing of the river, but its accomplishment will be certain in a few weeks.
Allow me to congratulate you on your great successes.
On the 15th of July
Halleck sent the following communication to the
Secretary of War in answer to his letter:--
I cannot at present give
Commodore Farragut any aid against
Vicksburg.
I am sending reinforcements to
General Curtis in
Arkansas, and to
General Buell in
Tennessee and
Kentucky.
Now let us look a moment at the position of
Beauregard's army, the only great force against
Halleck.
Both armies had lain for months in the condition of two men where one is afraid to fight and the other dares not.
Halleck says his troops were “not concentrated.”
Why were they not?
On the 10th of June
Beauregard wrote to
Lovell, commanding at
Vicksburg, as follows:--
With regard to Vicksburg, as already stated, I regard its fate as sealed.
You may defend it for awhile to hold the enemy at bay, but it must follow ere long the fate of Fort Pillow.
How important
Davis thought
Vicksburg was, is shown by his letter of the 14th of June, 1862, to
General Smith, commanding at
Vicksburg:--
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. . . . . . . . . . . . .
What progress is being made toward the completion of the
Arkansas?
What is the condition of your defence at
Vicksburg?
Can we do anything to aid you?
Disasters above and below increase the value of your position.
I hope and expect much from you.
On the 22d of June
General Bragg ordered to
Vicksburg the first reinforcements, six thousand of
Breckinridge's corps.
On the 26th
Van Dorn, who was left in command of
Beauregard's army, removed his headquarters to
Vicksburg, only to be immediately superseded by
Bragg, who was in command of the department.
On the 1st of June,
Beauregard with all his army was in full retreat from
Corinth.
On the 17th, he abandoned his command and went to
Bladen Springs, near
Mobile, sick.
Davis seems to have found some fault with
Beauregard for retreating, but
Beauregard says, “it was a brilliant and successful retreat,” which is about as good as a retreat can be.
Halleck had an army before
Corinth, on June 1, of ninety-five thousand men for duty.
On the same day,
Beauregard's command, covering the Army of the Mississippi, and the Army of the Department of the West, and some troops staying at
Columbus, Mississippi, amounted in all to fifty-four thousand men for duty.
These figures are from the official War Records, Volume X., Part I-II, p. 382.
On the 19th of July some of
Halleck's forces were
en route to
Chattanooga.
How can these statements of
Halleck be reconciled with each other, and with the facts?
If he desired to serve the country, they show that he was utterly careless of his duty, for I take leave to repeat that there was nothing so important to be done at that time for the cause of the
Union as to capture
Vicksburg and open the river.
A careful examination shows that there were not four thousand available armed men between
Vicksburg and
Halleck.
Lovell says that his “troops were indifferently armed.”
The truth is not to be disguised that
Halleck did not want to capture
Vicksburg, because then he would have had to share the honor with
Farragut and his fleet.
He never moved a man toward it,
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although he promised to so do. He was ordered so to do by the
Secretary of War, but he did not obey the order.
About a year afterwards, having done nothing, he was made general-in-chief of the army, when a singular revenge for his own conduct was put upon him. He ordered
Banks to go to
Vicksburg and help
Grant conquer it, and he ordered
Grant to go to
Baton Rouge and help
Banks conquer that, and neither of them obeyed him. They evidently took a leaf of disobedience out of his own book.
It may be said in excuse for
Halleck's not sending his troops to
Vicksburg that the condition of things at
Washington and the need of reinforcements because of
McClellan's defeat around
Richmond justified
Halleck in neglecting
Vicksburg and in sending his troops to
Washington.
There are two answers to that: First, that he did not send any troops there, but made as his excuse for not aiding
Farragut the statement that he had sent his troops to reinforce
Buell and also
Curtis.
Those reinforcements so sent away, on then comparatively unimportant errands, would have been invaluable if sent to
Vicksburg, which was nearer him than the points where they were actually sent.
The other answer is that
President Lincoln, having
Vicksburg strongly in his mind, as we know,--for the
Secretary of War had ordered
Halleck to co-operate with
Farragut,--wrote to him expressly not to send any troops to
Washington when he had important use for them in his own department:--
Your several despatches of yesterday to the
Secretary of War and myself received.
I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad for some reinforcements from you; still, do not send a man if, in your judgment, it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or will force you to give up, or weaken or delay, the
Chattanooga expedition.
Please tell me, could you make me a flying visit for consultation, without endangering the service in your department?
The only man that was in a “panic” concerning
Washington was
Halleck himself, as will be seen by his letter to
McClernand which I quote:--
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The defeat of
McClellan near
Richmond has produced another stampede in
Washington.
You will collect as rapidly as possible all the infantry regiments of your division, and take advantage of transportation by every train to transport them to
Columbus and thence to
Washington City.
General Quinby will be directed to turn over to you certain troops of his command.
The part of
General Wallace's division at
Memphis will go up the
Mississippi, and the portion at
Grand Junction will follow as soon as relieved. . . .
Halleck's letter shows the condition of his mind.
The following letter from
General Pope shows the condition of his opponents:--
A spy whom I sent some days ago to
Okolona has just returned.
The enemy is scattered along the whole road from
Columbus to
Tupelo, sixteen miles below
Guntown.
They are disorganized, mutinous, and starving.
He reports the woods full of deserters belonging to the northern counties of
Mississippi.
Nearly the whole of the
Tennessee, Arkansas, and
Kentucky troops have left.
A large rear guard has been strung along perpendicular to the road for twenty miles, driving the stragglers and all the cattle of every description before them.
The spy reports that the whole army is utterly demoralized, and ready to throw down their arms; the
Alabama troops have heard of
Wood's and
Negley's movements and are clamorous to go home.
On the 1st of June,
General Williams, commanding the expeditionary corps, then at
Baton Rouge, had gone up the river to make a demonstration on Camp Moore with the Thirtieth Massachusetts, the Ninth Connecticut, the Seventh Vermont, the Fourth Wisconsin,
Nims' battery and two sections of
Everett's, which would make his force about thirty-five hundred effective men.
8
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Upon the suggestion of the
flag-officer, on the 6th of June, I had issued an order as follows:--
General:--I am directed by the
major-general commanding to say that he will send you the remainder of
Everett's battery, with its horses and harnesses, the Thirty-First Massachusetts and the Seventh Vermont Regiments, and
Magee's cavalry, with transportation, ammunition, and forage for all.
With this force the general will expect you to proceed to
Vicksburg with the
flag-officer, and then take the town or have it burned at all hazards.
You will leave such force as you may judge necessary to hold
Baton Rouge.
Camp Moore is believed to be broken up substantially, and perhaps you will think a regiment sufficient;
Colonel McMillan's is recommended, as he has two pieces of cannon.
The
flag-officer has distinct instructions to open the river, and will do it, I doubt not. A large force is sent to you with what you have, and sufficient, as it would seem, to take any batteries and the supporting force they may have at
Vicksburg.
You will often be amused by reports of the enemy's strength.
Witness your report of the numbers approaching
Baton Rouge.
These stories are exaggerated always.
You will send up a regiment or two at once and cut off the neck of land beyond
Vicksburg by means of a trench across, thus:--
 |
|
Diagram showing Vicksburg's position on the River. |
making the cut about four feet deep and five feet wide.
The river itself will do the rest for us.
A large supply of spades and shovels has been sent for this purpose.
Report frequently.
By order of the
Major-General Commanding:
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 |
|
Profile of Canal across Burey's Point, opposite Vicksburg. |
On the 4th of July
General Williams reported:--
Have arrived at Vicksburg.
On June 25 commenced running and levelling the line of the cut-off canal, and on the morning of the 27th broke ground.
Between eleven and twelve hundred negroes, gathered from the neighboring plantations by armed parties, are engaged on the work.
With the hard-working twelve hundred negro force engaged and this prospect of a rise we are in good heart.
The project is a great one, and worthy of success.
In the next three days we expect to be ready for the waters of the Mississippi.
The fleets of Flag-Officers Farragut and Davis are waiting for the result with great interest.
Seven of Flag-Officer Farragut's vessels, having passed Vicksburg at four in the morning of the 28th, without silencing the batteries of the town, are anchored with Flag-Officer Davis' fleet of six mortar boats and four gunboats on the west side of Barney's Point.
Again on the 6th of July, he reported as follows:--
To-day's work of the negro force on the cut-off, duly organized into squads of twenty,with an intelligent non-commissioned officer or private to each, superintended by officers, is highly satisfactory.
The flag-officer with his fleet is most sanguine and even enthusiastic.
I regard the cut-off to be my best bower.
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There was no rise in the river, but on the contrary a great fall, so that it was reported to be impossible without three months labor to make a canal deep enough for the naval vessels.
Therefore I left
General Williams to co-operate with the fleet in the proposed capture of
Vicksburg, although I had learned that it was in the department of
Major-General Halleck.
That
Halleck might have no delicacy in calling for the co-operation of
General Williams I addressed to him the following letter:--
General:--I avail myself of the voyage of the
Tennessee to communicate with you upon the subject of
General Williams' brigade at
Vicksburg.
General Williams was sent up at a time when we should have had only local troops to meet at
Vicksburg.
It was not properly within my department, but the exigencies of the public service, as it seemed to me, justified the movement.
It is now quite different, as I am informed that a division at least of your army is moving upon
Vicksburg.
I have great need of
General Williams' command to aid me in clearing out the guerrillas from this State, who are doing infinite mischief.
I have therefore ordered his recall, as his force since the reinforcement by
Van Dorn and
Breckinridge of the enemy, is too small for operations alone, and a junction of
Generals Grant and
Curtis must give ample force for the reduction of the place.
The disposal of the guerrilla bands is easy of accomplishment, but it requires many men to hold the various points, which if not held only bring destruction upon our friends there.
If in anything I can aid your operations command me. I have sent a duplicate of this under cover to
General Grant for information as well as to
General Williams.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
Before writing this letter I surmised what the trouble with
Halleck was: inconsistency, vanity, cowardice,--one or all. I had determined that he should find no refuge in the fact that he supposed I would not give him aid. But knowing of the retreat of
Beauregard's
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army on the 10th of June, and of
Halleck's reply on the 23d that his own army was weak and disorganized, I was convinced as to the sort of a man I had to deal with, and I never had any more dealings with him during my stay in New Orleans.
Meanwhile I had received some information which put the proposed movement against
Mobile wholly to one side and also showed that
Farragut's fleet might at any moment be called from his attack on
Vicksburg.
Before the 16th of May, a short time after my arrival in New Orleans, a small French vessel, the
Catinet, came up and anchored at the head of the fleet.
Her officers and sailors did not sympathize with the
Union people of New Orleans, or with the
military officers, or troops.
Her commander did not do himself the honor of calling on the
commanding general even on a visit of ceremony.
He passed by the forts after
Farragut passed up without
Farragut seeing him.
I learned afterwards that he was simply a French spy. The only communication I had with him was within thirty days after his arrival.
He held a great jubilee on his vessel one evening, and had a large party there singing secession songs at the top of their voices, calling large crowds to the levee to hear them.
I sent him a communication saying that such conduct must not be repeated on board his vessel, and that if it was I should send down a battery of artillery to prevent it. It did not recur.
Meanwhile I was informed by the
Secretary of State, verbally, that information had been received, through confidential channels, from
Paris that
Emperor Louis Napoleon had made substantially this proposition to the
English government:--
That the two governments should unite in recognizing the independence of the
Confederacy.
That a treaty should then immediately be made with the
Confederacy through
Mason and
Slidell.
That
Louis Napoleon, being promised aid by the rebels, should make an attack upon
Mexico [which was afterwards made without their aid], for the purpose of establishing the empire of
Maximilian, and that he should occupy New Orleans as a base of his operations, as
Vera Cruz was not a harbor that could be safely occupied by a fleet, on account of its exposure to the “northers.”
More in detail, the last part of the scheme was this:
The Emperor was to assemble his fleet at
Martinique under the pretence of blockading
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Mexican ports,--which would be a mere pretence, for no such blockade would have been of any use. At once upon a declaration of war, without any further notice to us, his fleet was to attack and take
Forts St. Philip and
Jackson, and move on to New Orleans.
The rebels were to make an attack by land and dispossess the
United States of its control of
Louisiana.
For doing this,
Napoleon was to have
Texas re-annexed to
Mexico.
The message to me was that I must get ready to meet the attack by putting the forts in full repair and full armament, and that I must defend New Orleans at all hazards.
I was further told that for obvious reasons it was impossible that these orders should be entered of record unless carried out.
This was a somewhat startling condition of affairs.
If a French fleet attempted to pass the forts I was to stop it by firing upon it. That would have been a pretty distinct act of war on a nation which was neutral, so far as was known to me officially.
If the fight took place and I were successful perhaps I might be excused for having gone into an undertaking for which I had no proper legal justification.
But if I were unsuccessful and it became necessary for our government to make an explanation, I knew enough of
Seward to know that he would instantly deny that any such instructions were given me, and would claim that the whole affair was a matter of my rashness and desire to quarrel with the
French government on account of the actions of the
French citizens of New Orleans towards my army and the
United States.
I had several reasons for believing that the projected enterprise was fully determined upon:--
First, the conduct of the French ship
Catinet and its officers.
Second, the fact that the communication came to me from a source that I could well credit.
Third, it was so characteristic of the
French Emperor.
It was certainly best to put the forts in thorough order for defence, and that I proceeded to do with the utmost energy and despatch.
I ordered
Lieutenant Weitzel to examine the forts, which he had built, and to ascertain and report what was necessary to put them in such condition that no fleet could pass them, by day or by night, as
Farragut had done.
He jumped into my headquarters boat and went down, and returned very soon with an most admirable statement
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of the time it would take and what would be required to put the forts in such condition.
We came to the conclusion that by taking the heavy guns which had been put above New Orleans to meet a fleet coming down the river, and such guns as were just below the city at
Chalmette, and using them to make proper water batteries below
Forts Jackson and
St. Philip, we could, without doubt, hold the forts against the French fleet, especially, since if they got anywhere near past our forts, they would meet
Farragut's fleet, when there would probably be a very different performance from that with the rebels when his fleet passed up. Then to my utter astonishment
Weitzel added:--
“But, General, we cannot repair those forts without an order from
Washington.
I will write
General Totten, the chief of engineers, about it.”
I said an impatient word about
Totten.
“What has he got to do with it?”
“No fort can be repaired, General, by the army regulations, without permission of the chief of engineers.”
“Well,” I said, “I can get along without that permission, for I have money and men enough with which to do it, and I will send at once for the ordnance, if we are short.”
“Oh, but, General, I do not see how I can do it.”
I loved
Weitzel then as I have ever since, but not knowing whether we should have time enough to get the forts ready, I said with great impatience:--
“Well, if you cannot do as you are ordered I will get somebody else to do what I want done, but I regret it fearfully.
I should be to blame in this, not you, and my orders would justify you. You may go.”
In the course of an hour, while I was reflecting upon the difficulties of my position, my chief of staff,
Major Strong, came in and said:--
“General, what have you been doing to poor
Weitzel?”
“Nothing,” I answered, “but telling him what I want him to do and what he can do.”
“ But, General, you have broken his heart.
A braver and stronger man doesn't live; but I found him in his quarters sobbing like a child and so broken down that he could not tell me what you had
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done, only that you ordered him to do what he could not do. He says that he doesn't fear it on his own account, because the order of the commanding general will justify him in doing anything, and adds, if you were an officer of the regular army he would obey you without a word; but he loves you, General, and he says it would be your ruin and the loss of your command to do what you want done.”
I sketched to Strong what I wanted done, but not the reasons why I wanted it done.
I asked him to go and bring
Weitzel.
When
Weitzel came in I said:--
“Strong has been telling me what your feelings are. I know what they are towards me, and I feel very grateful for them, and I am glad that you said to him that you would do what I wanted done if I were a regular officer.
But you also said that I did not know the risk I was incurring.
I was both glad and sorry to hear that.
I thought,
Weitzel, you had been long enough with me to believe that I know more about military law and my responsibility than all the regular officers in the service put together.
As a lawyer I ought to know my duty, and as a man I am willing to do it without any regard to consequences.
Now, you and Strong go together and draw any order that you two believe will justify you in obeying my commands in this matter, and I must and will take the responsibility.
Upon reflection, I will not take no for an answer.
Now go and make your order.”
I should remark here perhaps that my plan of carrying out campaigns was always to give my orders first and have them obeyed, and put them in writing afterwards as a justification for the obedience.
Papers came last, not first, with me.
In a few minutes they returned with a very carefully drawn order directing
Weitzel to go and do what was wanted to be done, the details to be arranged in writing afterwards.
I signed it and had it countersigned by my chief of staff.
“Now, strong,” said I, “put that on the order book, and
Weitzel, you go and get from the quartermaster anything you want, including any number of men you can use,--and they may be hired if necessary,--and I will pay the bills.
We have lost three hours here, and I shall expect you by diligence to make it up. Good morning.”
Colonel Jones was in command of the forts, with the Twenty-Sixth regiment, and he was instructed to exercise his men as much
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as possible as heavy artillerists.
The forts were put in apple-pie order and the men were thoroughly drilled.
I may add here that
Weitzel never could settle that account with his department, although he charged himself with the moneys received from me and furnished vouchers for the expenditures.
It was “irregular,” and if he had stayed in that department as an engineer officer, I suppose, according to army regulations, his pay would have been stopped to reimburse the
United States for money that never came from the
United States and that had been expended in the utmost good faith, the
United States getting full value for it.
I was further convinced that my information about the French fleet was true, because on the 16th of June the city government of New Orleans, which had not then been disbanded, but was soon after, passed the following resolution unanimously, under a suspension of the rules:--
Whereas, It has come to the knowledge of this council that, for the first time in the history of this city, a large fleet of the navy of France is about to visit New Orleans, of which fleet the Catinet, now in our port, is the pioneer; and whereas, this council bears in grateful remembrance the many ties of amity and good feeling which unite the people of this city with those of France, to whose paternal protection New Orleans owes its foundation and early prosperity, and to whom it is especially grateful for the jealousy with which, in the cession of the State, it guaranteed all the rights of property, person, and religious freedom of its citizens; therefore.
Be it resolved, That the freedom and hospitalities of the city of New Orleans be tendered, through the commander of the Catinet, to the French naval fleet during its sojourn in our port; and that a committee of five of this council be appointed, with the mayor, to make such tender and such other arrangements as may be necessary to give effect to the same.
This resolution was published in the New Orleans
Bee.
I made the following answer:--
This action is an insult, as well to the United States, as to the friendly and powerful nation toward whose officers it is directed The offer of the freedom of a captured city by the captives would merit letters patent for its novelty, were there not doubts of its usefulness as an invention.
The tender of its hospitalities by a government to which police duties and sanitary regulations only are entrusted, is simply an invitation to the calaboose or the hospital.
The United States authorities are the only
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ones here capable of dealing with amicable or unamicable nations, and will see to it that such acts of courtesy or assistance are extended to any armed vessel of the Emperor of France as shall testify the national, traditional, and hereditary feelings of grateful remembrance with which the United States Government and people appreciate the early aid of France, and her many acts of friendly regard, shown upon so many national and fitting occasions.
The action of the city council in this behalf must be reversed.
But another question in this regard troubled me very much: How was I to fire upon the French fleet, without orders, when it came up. I reflected; indeed I examined the
French treaties and the law of nations.
Finally I hit upon this expedient.
The sanitary regulations of a garrisoned place are military regulations, and are such as the commanding general may deem proper to enforce, especially when martial law is declared.
They are to be respected and obeyed by friendly nations and its officers, because they are for the safety of all. If disobeyed knowingly, they are to be enforced by all the means and power which it is necessary to use. Now the French fleet would come from
Martinique, a port whose condition was wretched, and was a condemned one.
It was hot weather and the yellow fever was there, and my orders were that every vessel, whether of our own nation or of any other, must remain below the forts at a point designated until it had been examined by the health officer, and a report made and written instructions received from me to allow it to proceed.
The forts were to stop, and, if necessary, to fire upon, any vessel that refused to obey these quarantine regulations.
Therefore it was made the duty of the health officer to hail every vessel and to give a copy of these orders to the officer who received him on deck.
If the health officer was not received on board to examine a vessel, he was to drop his hospital flag into his boat as a signal, and if the vessel then proceeded up the river, she was, at all hazards, to be stopped before she reached the forts.
I believed I could justify myself in relying upon this course of law in firing upon the French vessels if they attempted to pass the forts without obeying my quarantine regulations.
And a shot in return would justify the whole fire of both forts.
Early in June I learned that an attempt was to be made to organize a revolt and insurrection in New Orleans with the intent
[
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to recapture the place.
On the 10th of June,
Beauregard's armies commenced to scatter.
A great many conscripts were disbanded; and they came to New Orleans, not as paroled soldiers but as stragglers from the Confederate army.
As portions of
Beauregard's army might be sent down to make an attack on the city,--as they afterwards were under
Breckinridge,--it was necessary for me to be in readiness.
The only thing that could make such an attack successful was an organized force rising upon my rear in New Orleans.
itself. I concluded to find out who in the city were loyal and who disloyal, and have that made a matter of record.
Again, I knew the confiscation acts were pending in Congress and would soon be passed.
By these the property of disloyal men would be confiscated by the government.
I reasoned that as soon as the confiscation commenced, every man would claim he had always been loyal and would prove it by his neighbors, who were as disloyal as himself, and so recover his property — as has since been done to the extent of millions.
I determined that every man who chose to take the oath of allegiance and so declare himself, should have an opportunity to do it, and, while forced upon no man, it should be taken by every man who desired to hold any office or position under the
United States or to receive any special favor of the
United States except the protection of person, property, and liberty.
The inhabitants of New Orleans at this time might be thus classed: Union men; rebels; foreigners friendly to the
United States; foreigners sympathizing with the
Confederates; soldiers from
Beauregard's army, some inclined to submission and some not so inclined.
These soldiers numbered several thousands, and it was necessary to have them singled out and either paroled or confined for refusing to be paroled.
To put on record the loyal and the disloyal, I issued
General Order No. 41.
This order required that the oath of allegiance prescribed by law should be taken by every person who was a citizen of the
United States Those who had resided in the country five years, though foreign born, should be deemed citizens if they had not sought protection of their government within that time.
All foreigners
[
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claiming any of the privileges of the American citizen, or protection or favor from the
Government of the
United States, should take and subscribe the oath.
The books should be open, and a proper officer would administer the oath to any person desiring to take the same, the officer to witness the subscription of the name and to furnish to the party taking the oath a certificate thereof.
This order immediately aroused the intense indignation of the consuls, and they addressed me in a labored argument to show that the oath offered to them would be equivalent to naturalizing them as citizens, and that although they were not forced to take it, yet they could have nothing of protection until they-did take it and acknowledge themselves as citizens of the
United States.
They then said that that would be a violation of their neutrality.
The argument further was, that the foreigners' oath required them to swear that they would act as spies for the
United States, and that the requirement that they “should not conceal any act done,” required them to swear that they would be spies and denunciators for the
United States.
This address was signed by all the consuls, headed by the
French consul.
To this I answered in substance that there was nothing compulsory about the order; that I had nothing to do with naturalization; that I had asked no such oath.
As to their statement that this oath compelled every foreigner to descend to the level of a spy for the benefit of the
United States, I answered that there was no just construction of language which would give any such interpretation to the order.
The oath required him who took it not to conceal any wrong that had been or was about to be done in aid of the enemies of the
United States.
I continued:--
It has been read and translated as if it required you to reveal all such acts.
Conceal is a verb active in our language; concealment is an act done, not a thing suffered by the concealers.
Let me thus state the difference in meaning.
If I am passing about and see a thief picking the pocket of my neighbor, and I say nothing about it unless called upon by a proper tribunal, that is not concealment of the theft; but if I throw my cloak over the thief to screen him from the police officer while he does it, I then “conceal” the theft.
Again, if I know that my neighbor is about to join the rebel army, and I go about my usual business, I do not “conceal” the fact; but if upon being inquired of by the proper authority as to
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where my neighbor is about to go, I say that he is going to sea, I then conceal his acts and intentions.
Now, if any citizen or foreigner means to conceal rebellious or traitorous acts against the United States, in the sense above given, it will be much more for his personal comfort that he gets out of this department at once.
Indeed, gentlemen, if any subject of a foreign state does not like our laws, or the administration of them, he has an immediate, effectual, and appropriate remedy in his own hands, alike pleasant to him and to us; and that is, not to annoy his consul with complaints of those laws or the administration of them, or his consul wearying the authorities with verbose protests, but simply to go home,--stay not on the order of his going, but go at once.
Such a person came here without our invitation; he will be parted with without our regrets.
But he must not have committed crimes against our laws, and then expect to be allowed to go home to escape the punishment of those crimes.
The taking of the oath among the citizens went on. The foreigners all claimed that the form of the oath was such that they could not take it; whereupon I changed the form of the oath prescribed, by
General Order No. 42, as follows:--
headquarters Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, June 19, 1862.
General Order No. 42.
The
commanding general has received information that certain of the foreign residents in this department, notwithstanding the explanations of the terms of the oath prescribed in
General Order No. 41, contained in his reply to the foreign consuls, have still scruples about taking that oath.
Anxious to relieve the consciences of all who honestly entertain doubts upon this matter, and not to embarrass any, especially neutrals, by his necessary military orders, the commanding general hereby revises
General Order No. 41, so far as to permit any foreign subject, at his election, to take and subscribe the following oath, instead of the oath at first set forth:--
I, . . . . . . . . . . ., do solemnly swear that I will, to the best of my ability, support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.
So help me God!
[Traduction.]
Je, . . . . . . . . . ., jure solennellement autant qu'il sera en moi, de soutenir, de maintenir et de defendre la Constitution des Etats-Uris.
Que Dieu me soit en aide!
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The general is sure that no foreign subject can object to this oath, as it is in the very words of the oath taken by every officer of the
European Brigade, prescribed more than a year ago in “Les reglements de la Legion Francaise, formee à la Nouvelle
Orleans, le 26d'avril, 1861,” as will be seen by the extract below, and claimed as an act of the strictest neutrality by the officers taking it, and, for more than a year, has passed by all the foreign consuls — so far as he is informed — without protest:--
Serment que doivent preter tous les officiers de la Legion Francaise.
I,. . . . . . . . . . . ., do solemnly swear that I will, to the best of my ability, discharge the duties of . . . . . . . . . . of the
French Legion, and that I will support, protect, and defend the
Constitution of the
State and of the
Confederate States.
So help me God!
Sworn to and subscribed before me.
[Traduction.]
Etat De La Louisiane,
Paroisse D'Orleans.
Je, . . . . . . . . . . . ., jure solennellement de remplir, autant qu'il sera en moi, les devoirs de . . . . . . . . . . . ., de la Legion Francaise, et je promets de soutenir, de maintenir, et de defendre la constitution de l'etat et celle des Etats Confederes.
Que
Dieu me soit en aide!
Assermente et signe devant moi.
By command of
On the 7th of August, it was reported that the oath prescribed to the citizens had been taken by 11,723 persons, and foreign neutrals' oath by 2,499, and that 4,933 privates and 211 officers of the Confederate army had given the required parole.
The women generally refused to take the oath.
Meanwhile, it became necessary to take another precaution, and that was to require all the arms in the city to be delivered up and put in my possession.
To this, the
French consul of course objected in a letter to
Lieutenant Weitzel, who was the assistant military commandant.
This letter was as follows:--
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French consulate at New Orleans, New Orleans, August 12, 1862.
Sir:--The new order of the day, which has been published this morning, and by which you require that all and whatever arms which may be in the possession of the people of this city, must be delivered up, has caused the most serious alarm among the
French subjects of New Orleans.
Foreigners, sir, and particularly Frenchmen, have, notwithstanding the accusations brought against some of them by certain persons, sacrificed everything to maintain, during the actual conflict, the neutrality imposed upon them.
When arms were delivered them by the municipal authorities, they only used them to maintain order and defend personal property; and those arms have since been almost all returned.
And it now appears, according to the tenor of your order of to-day, that French subjects, as well as citizens, are required to surrender their personal arms, which could only be used in self-defence.
For some time past, unmistakable signs have manifested themselves among the servile population of the city and surrounding country, of their intention to break the bonds which bind them to their masters, and many persons apprehend an actual revolt.
It is these signs, this prospect of finding ourselves completely unarmed, in the presence of a population from which the greatest excesses are feared, that we are above all things justly alarmed; for the result of such a state of things would fall on all alike who were left without the means of self-defence.
It is not denied that the protection of the United States government would be extended to them in such an event, but that protection could not be effective at all times and in all places, nor provide against those internal enemies, whose unrestrained language and manners are constantly increasing, and who are but partially kept in subjection by the conviction that their masters are armed.
I submit to you, sir, these observations, with the request that you take them into consideration.
Please accept, sir, the assurance of my high esteem.
The Consul of
France,
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I do not see how I can add anything to my reply to this letter.
The evident desire to hold on to the arms impelled me to make my order more effectual, and therefore I must prevent the concealment of them by a high penalty; and also I sent this reply:--
headquarters Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, August 14, 1862.
Sir:--Your official note to
Lieutenant Weitzel has been forwarded to me.
I see no just cause of complaint against the order requiring the arms of private citizens to be given up. It is the usual course pursued in cities similarly situated to this, even without any exterior force in the neighborhood.
You will observe that it will not do to trust to mere professions of neutrality.
I trust most of your countrymen are in good faith
neutral; but it is unfortunately true that some of them are not. This causes the good, of necessity, to suffer for the acts of the bad.
I take leave to call your attention to the fact, that the United States forces gave every immunity to
Monsieur Bonnegrass, who claimed to be the
French consul at
Baton Rouge; allowed him to keep his arms, and relied upon his neutrality; but his son was taken prisoner on the battlefield in arms against us.
You will also do me the favor to remember that very few of the
French subjects here have taken the oath of neutrality, which was offered to, but not required of them, by my
Order No. 41, although all the officers of the
French Legion had, with your knowledge and assent, taken the oath to support the constitution of the
Confederate States.
Thus you see I have no guarantee for the good faith of bad men.
I do not understand how it is that arms are altered in their effectiveness by being “personal property,” nor do I see how arms which will serve for personal defence ( “qui ne peuvent servir que pour leur defense personnelle” ) cannot be as effectually used for offensive warfare.
Of the disquiet of which you say. there are signs manifesting themselves among the black population, from a desire to break their bonds ( “certaines dispositions à rompre les liens qui les attachent à leurs maitres” ), I have been a not inattentive observer, without wonder, because it would seem natural, when their masters had set them the example of rebellion against constituted authorities, that the negroes, being an imitative race, should do likewise.
But surely the representative of the emperor, who does not tolerate slavery in
France, does not desire his countrymen to be armed for the purpose of preventing “the negroes from breaking their bonds.”
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Let me assure you that the protection of the
United States against violence, either by negroes or white men, whether citizens or foreign, will continue to be as perfect as it has been since our advent here; and far more so, manifesting itself at all moments and everywhere ( “tous les instants et partout” ), than any improvised citizens' organization can be.
Whenever the inhabitants of this city will, by a public and united act, show both their loyalty and neutrality, I shall be glad of their aid to keep the peace, and indeed to restore the city to them.
Till that time, however, I must require the arms of all the inhabitants,
white and
black, to be under my control.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
This order was thoroughly effective.
Attempts were made to conceal arms, but the negroes complained of them in order to get the rewards, and whoever concealed them were dealt with in a manner that showed the folly of such conduct.
Well-known and well-tried Union men were allowed, upon application to the provost court, to retain their arms.
There were delivered up to my officer rising six thousand.
Further, to prevent the possibility of organization, the coming together of any number of people, save the police and fire brigade, was prohibited by a
general order.
My system of information was so perfect that there could be no considerable breach of that order without my knowledge, as we have seen.
From the first, I felt perfectly safe in New Orleans, and I immediately arranged to hold the city proper with a very small force in view of the possible prevalence of yellow fever, which, thank heaven!
did not come.
When my guards were posted, I had as a reserve force less than two hundred and fifty men. My whole army was regarded by the rebels as very small, yet I held the whole of
Western Louisiana east of the
Red River.
I sent small parties of troops when necessary everywhere in it, and no one was ever disturbed except a small party under a flag of truce, which was seized.
Governor Moore, on June 12, sent the following information to
President Davis:--
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. . . The army of Butler is insignificant in numbers, and that fact makes our situation the more humiliating.
He has possession of New Orleans with troops not equalling in number an ordinary city mob. He has Baton Rouge, and, until Fuller's exploit,10 used the Opelousas railroad to transport small parties to various places in the interior, who intimidated our people, and perpetrated the most appalling incendiarisms and brutality.
Our people were demoralized, and no wonder, when our forts and strong places had been the scenes of the disgraceful conduct of officers who had charge of their defence, of which 1 have given you some details in a previous letter.
Lovell, who was in command of that department, suggested, on the 7th of June, that Department No. 1 of
Louisiana should be abandoned.
Lee responded on the 16th of June that he deemed the department of too much importance to be abandoned.
“He regrets his inability to send you reinforcements.
He knows of no troops that can be spared at any point, unless
General Beauregard can send you some from his command.”
I, myself, had made repeated applications for reinforcements that I might move upon the enemy, but the situation of the Army of the Potomac around
Washington prevented anything being sent.
The light draught gunboats that were required in February as absolutely necessary in a department where everybody went by water, were never sent.
I wanted twelve; I had captured two and bought one, the
Estrella, and that was put in the hands of
Farragut so that he could have a light draught boat for his own operations up the river.
The operations of the fleet of
Farragut, and of the eighteen mortar boats of
Porter at the
siege of Vicksburg, where the utter inefficiency of
Porter's invention of the use of mortar boats in military operations was again fully demonstrated, are matters of which I have hereinbefore spoken.
As
Weitzel's Union report, and as
Duncan's rebel report show, they left
Forts Jackson and
St. Philip substantially as defensible as before the week's bombardment, and their effect before
Vicksburg and its batteries was another demonstrative illustration.
The guns of the fleet, it was known, would be quite harmless, because the high cliffs on which
Vicksburg is situated rendered it substantially Violation of a flag of truce.
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impracticable to elevate the guns of the fleet so as to do more than reach the batteries which were placed on the cliffs and so arranged that their guns might be run forward and shoot down on the fleet, and then be drawn back and reloaded in safety.
Therefore, reliance was placed upon the shells from the fire of the mortar fleet to dismount the guns.
The mortar fleet, aided by all the guns of the fleet, commenced its fire on the 21st of June, and
Farragut passed the batteries on the 28th of June after three hours passage within range of the batteries.
The entire harmlessness of the noise and confusion of that performance as a military operation, or in any other way, is fully demonstrated by the reports of
General Smith, the immediate rebel commander, and of
Earl Van Dorn, the department commander, extracts from which I give, from War Records, Series I., Vol.
XV., pp. 8, 9.
General Smith reports:--
The roar of cannon was now continuous and deafening; loud explosions shook the city to its foundations; shot and shell went hissing and tearing through trees and walls, scattering fragments far and wide in their terrific flight; men, women, and children rushed into the streets, and, amid the crash of falling houses, commenced their hasty flight to the country for safety This continued for about an hour and a half, when the enemy left, the vessels that had passed the lower batteries continuing on up the river.
The result of this effort on the part of the enemy was most satisfactory; not a single gun was silenced, none disabled, and, to their surprise, the serious bombardment of the preceding seven days had thrown nothing out of fighting trim.
It also demonstrated to our satisfaction that how large soever the number of guns and mortar boats, our batteries could probably be successfully held; consequently that the ultimate success of our resistance hinged upon a movement by land. . . .
General Van Dorn says:--
It is a matter of surprise that not a single gun was dismounted during the whole time, and only two temporarily disabled, both being repaired in one night.
The casualties on our side during the entire siege were twenty-two killed and wounded. Not a gun was dismounted and but two were temporarily disabled.
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 |
|
Brid's-eye-view of Vicksburg and vicinity, June 5, 1862. |
[
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I hope these facts will allay in some degree the great fear of our citizens of a war with
England lest our cities should be bombarded.
If ever done, it will be at long range.
Attention is called to the facts stated: no house burned, but some penetrated.
I believe that the mortar fleet experiment in warlike operations begun and has ended with
Porter.
To show the opinion of
Admiral Farragut as to the cause of the surrender of
Forts Jackson and
St. Philip, it may not be uninteresting to append the following letter:--
U. S. Flag Ship Hartford, at anchor off New Orleans, May 1, 1862.
Dear General:--I have received your communication sent by
Captain Conant of the Thirty-First Massachusetts Regiment, for which please accept my sincere thanks.
It affords me no little gratification that our friends who were anxiously looking on should consider that we had “not only performed our duty,” but, “did it brilliantly,” and to the “admiration” of our associates in arms, who watched our movements with the feelings of military men who knew that on the result depended their own success in gaining a foothold on the enemy's soil.
The intrepidity with which you so soon followed up our success by landing your forces at the Quarantine, through mud and mire and water for miles, and which enabled us to tighten the cords around them, has also added to my obligations; and I trust that you will now occupy and hold the city without further difficulty other than those incident to a conquered city disordered by anarchy and the reign of terror which this unfortunate city has passed through.
I am, very respectfully and truly, your obedient servant,
When the operations around
Vicksburg came to an end, I again went to
Baton Rouge.
I arrived on the 26th of July with the Second Brigade, under the command of
General Williams.
This brigade had suffered very severely from sickness, though not so greatly in the loss of troops by death.
As I have said,
Baton
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Rouge was very healthy for the troops, and I saw fit to leave them there for a few days until health was restored.
Indeed, there were some regiments that could not bring into line more than two hundred men.
On the 29th of July,
General Breckinridge ordered a general movement of all his troops on
Baton Rouge.
His own division consisted of four brigades, in addition to
General Clark's division and the large portion of
General Ruggles' brigade.
Orders were issued requiring all troops to concentrate for this move, stating it to be of the greatest importance.
True,
Breckinridge's division had suffered somewhat from disease, but not in any degree as ours had suffered.
The other troops had been quietly camped and drilled at Camp Moore and elsewhere for months.
On the 30th of July he moved from
Baton Rouge with his full force.
In his report, which he did not render until the 30th of September, he makes every attempt to belittle his force, although he denominates the battle a victory.
The “War Records” show that he had forty-six different organizations of some sort present.
Van Dorn had ordered him to attack on the 5th of August at daybreak, supported by the ram
Arkansas, which had been sent down there.
He says he intended a surprise.
General Williams, in command of the department, learned when the attack would be made.
On the 4th he called together his several commanding officers and selected the position of his forces to meet the attack.
General Weitzel reported that this position was an admirable one.
Then
Williams awaited
Breckinridge.
The attack was made under cover of an almost impenetrable fog, but it was fully met by
Williams and his command.
Breckinridge made one mistake: He knew our centre was held by the
Indiana regiment, and he had also learned that at dress parade on the night of the 4th only one hundred and twenty men of that regiment appeared for duty, and he therefore deemed that point the weakest one.
But when the tocsin of attack sounded through our camps, the men of the
Indiana regiment turned out nearly three times more on the line of fight.
They seized their muskets and abandoned their hospitals, although some of them were so weak that they could not have marched a mile.
The same was true in a lesser degree of the other regiments.
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We early met with a great misfortune:
Williams was killed immediately after his address to the Twenty-First Indiana, whose acting colonel,
Keith, had received a disabling wound.
He said: “Indianans, your field officers are all killed; I will lead you;” when almost immediately a ball put an end to his life.
The men retreated at first a short distance from their camps where they were posted, but the enemy were finally repulsed by a steady and well-directed fire.
Union troops were not encouraged by the non-appearance of the
Arkansas, for they knew nothing about her. Our gunboats could not aid them — unless an attempt were to be made to turn their flanks — because they would have had to fire over
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our troops at very long range upon the enemy, which would have been disastrous.
Suffice it to say that the enemy, after three hours and a half of fighting, the fog having lifted, were repulsed in full run, leaving their dead and wounded in piles in our hands.
Colonel Cahill, of the Ninth Connecticut, was left in command.
He cautiously sent out scouts to a very considerable distance, and found the houses on the route filled with the dead and wounded.
A flag of truce came from the victorious (?)
General Breckinridge, asking leave for a party to come in and bury the dead and to bring out
General Clark who had been wounded.
That flag of truce was answered that the task of burying the dead had already been substantially accomplished, and that
General Clark was in the house of a personal friend of his.
The ram
Arkansas, from which so much had been expected, had come down the river and run herself on shore about four miles and a half above
Baton Rouge.
Breckinridge says he had no information of this until the morning of the day of the battle.
As soon as he learned it he sent out a party, at the head of which was one of his staff officers, the late
Governor Wickliffe of
Kentucky.
Wickliffe was in my office later with a flag of truce, and he told me that he went on board the
Arkansas and that her crew set her on fire with her guns all shotted, and that she exploded on her way down river.
This was stated to me in the presence of
Commodore William Porter (a brother of
Admiral Porter), who had just before stated to me that that morning he went up with the iron-clad
Essex, from which nobody had heard anything during the night, and that he met the
Arkansas coming down, opened fire upon her, and by his second shot she blew up.
Wickliffe replied that nobody fired any shot at her, and that they did not see or hear from the
Essex.
I knew
Wickliffe before I knew
Porter and his reputation, so that I believed
Wickliffe and not
Porter, although in my first despatch about the
battle of Baton Rouge, I gave
Porter and the
Essex the credit of having done that which
Porter said they had done.
Soon after, I was informed by
Farragut from up river that
Porter's account was not true, and I corrected my subsequent report in that regard.
It will be observed that I state that the
Arkansas was put on shore.
My ground for this is that there are no tides in the river, and how
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could she have been set on fire and shoved off if she ran ashore?
A dozen or more published reports in the “War correspondence” confirm this account of this transaction.
But its very truth did not prevent
Porter from going before Congress and getting an appropriation of some hundreds of thousands of dollars — how much, the records will show — voted to him and his men for their courage, conduct, and gallantry in attacking and destroying the
Arkansas.
It is hard to tell the fact, but it must be said, that lying is a family vice.
At first I determined to hold
Baton Rouge, but upon reflection I changed my mind.
For I saw that an attack on New Orleans was the ultimate object of this attack on
Baton Rouge.
As I have often said before,
Baton Rouge was of no possible military importance, and was held only for its healthiness.
But all danger of yellow fever was now over, and New Orleans was as healthy at that hour, as the statistics will show, as the city of
Boston.
Hence I determined to concentrate my troops and abandon
Baton Rouge.
This I did very leisurely, bringing away everything of public property that could be of any use to the enemy.
The State library I placed in the library building in New Orleans, and the
State statue of
Washington, a very valuable relic, I sent to the Patent Office.
I was certain that no attack would be made upon New Orleans, at least until the other iron-clad which was being built upon the
Yazoo River should be gotten ready to come down and lead the attack.
This iron-clad, as I learned from a man I sent to examine her, could not possibly be done before the middle of October.
To show the accuracy and reliability of my secret service system, I give the report of
General Williams on the 2d of August:--
John Mahan [Mann?] with a pass from
General Butler, dated July 22, for
Vicksburg, and who left New Orleans July 25, and arrived at Pontchatoula and Camp Moore Monday, July 28, having proceeded up the Jackson railroad as far as
Jackson, arrived here by the way of Summit, Liberty, and
Bayou Sara this morning at 10 o'clock. He says he saw
Breckinridge's force of six full regiments and fourteen guns at Camp Moore and Pontchatoula Monday, July 28, and that their purpose is to
[
485]
attack this place; says they may be expected on the rear of
Baton Rouge at this time, or at any time in the next day or two.
If
Mahan be a true man and a true observer there is to be an attack here or at New Orleans; if at New Orleans, a demonstration here.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
P. S. I shall send
Mahan down by the first opportunity to headquarters.
I hope the rebels have as many sick as I have.
Perhaps (let us hope at least) that a battle may to our sick exert all the effects of the best tonic of the pharmacopoeia.
T. W., Brigadier-General.
I answered
General Williams on the 3d; “I received your note by the hand of
John Mann [Mahan?], who was in my confidential service.
While his information may be relied upon as correct, yet all the inferences which he draws may not be.”
I farther gave reasons which I had from the movement of the enemy at Camp Moore that the attack would be delayed.
“And while I would not have you relax your vigilance, I think you need fear no assault at present.
When it does come I know you will be ready.”
On the evening of that day I sent a confidential messenger with a copy of the enemy's order that the attack should be made on August 5 at daybreak, to
Williams, with directions to destroy the copy, for if it should fall into the hands of the enemy, the source of information might be traced.
That was the universal rule with me, in order to relieve the fears of my secret service men.
After the
battle of Baton Rouge, I issued a congratulatory order, and published and distributed to my command an appreciative notice of the lamented
Williams:--
General Order No. 56.
The commanding general announces to the Army of the Gulf the sad event of the death of
Brig.-Gen. Thomas Williams, commanding Second Brigade, in camp at
Baton Rouge.
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The victorious achievement — the repulse of the division of
Major-General Breckinridge by the troops led by
General Williams, and the destruction of the mail-clad
Arkansas by
Captain Porter, of the navy — is made sorrowful by the fall of our brave, gallant, and successful fellow soldier.
General Williams graduated at
West Point in 1837; at once joined the Fourth Artillery in
Florida, where he served with distinction; was thrice brevetted for gallant and meritorious services in
Mexico as a member of
General Scott's staff.
His life was that of a soldier, devoted to his country's service.
His country mourns in sympathy with his wife and children, now that country's care and precious charge.
We, his companions in arms, who had learned to love him, weep the true friend, the gallant gentleman, the brave soldier, the accomplished officer, the pure patriot and victorious hero, and the devoted
Christian.
All and more went out when
Williams died.
By a singular felicity the manner of his death illustrated each of these generous qualities.
The chivalric American gentleman, he gave up the vantage of the cover of the houses of the city — forming his lines in the open field — lest the women and children of his enemies should be hurt in the fight.
A good general, he had made his dispositions and prepared for battle at the break of day, when he met his foe.
A brave soldier, he received the death-shot leading his men.
A patriot hero, he was fighting the battle of his country, and died as went up the cheer of victory.
A Christian, he sleeps in the hope of the
Blessed Redeemer.
His virtues we cannot exceed — his example we may emulate — and mourning his death, we pray “may our last end be like his.”
The customary tribute of mourning will be worn by the officers in the department.
By command of
General Order No. 57.
Soldiers of the Army of the Gulf:
Your successes have heretofore been substantially bloodless.
Taking and holding the most important strategic and commercial positions, with the aid of the gallant navy, by the wisdom of your combinations and the moral power of your arms, it has been left for the last few days to baptize you in blood.
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The Spanish conqueror of
Mexico won imperishable renown by landing in that country and burning his transport ships, to cut off all hope of retreat.
You, more wise and economical, but with equal providence against retreat, sent yours home.
Organized to operate on the sea-coast, you advanced your outposts to
Baton Rouge, the capital of the
State of Louisiana, more than two hundred and fifty miles into the interior.
Attacked there by a division of our rebel enemies, under command of a major-general recreant to loyal
Kentucky (whom some of us would have honored before his apostasy), of doubly superior numbers, you have repulsed in the open field his myrmidons, who took advantage of your sickness from the malaria of the marshes of
Vicksburg to make a cowardly attack.
The brigade at
Baton Rouge has routed the enemy.
He has lost three
brigadier-generals, killed, wounded, and prisoners; many colonels and field officers.
He has more than a thousand killed and wounded.
You have captured three pieces of artillery, six caissons, two stand of colors, and a large number of prisoners.
You have buried his dead on the field of battle and are caring for his wounded.
You have convinced him that you are never so sick as not to fight your enemy if he desires the contest.
You have shown him that if he cannot take an outpost after weeks of preparation what would be his fate with the main body.
If your general should say he was proud of you it would only be to praise himself; but he will say he is proud to be one of you.
In this battle the
Northeast and Northwest mingled their blood on the field, as they had long ago joined their hearts in the support of the
Union.
Michigan stood by
Maine;
Massachusetts supported
Indiana;
Wisconsin aided
Vermont; while
Connecticut, represented by the sons of the evergreen shamrock, fought as our fathers did at Boyne Waters.
While we all mourn the loss of many brave comrades, we who were absent envy them the privilege of dying upon the battle-field for our country under the starry folds of her victorious flag.
The colors and guidons of the several corps engaged in this contest will have inscribed upon them “
Baton Rouge.”
To complete the victory, the iron-clad steamer
Arkansas, the last naval hope of the rebellion, hardly awaited the gallant attack of the
Essex, but followed the example of her sisters, the
Merrimack,
Manassas, Mississippi, and
Louisiana, by her own destruction.
By command of
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When I turned my attention to the perfecting of my fortifications above New Orleans at
Chalmette, on the upper side of the city, I met an unexpected obstacle.
When that line was established, upon consultation with
General Phelps I came to the conclusion that all the wood and timber must be cut down for a considerable distance in front of our line, from the river to the lake.
I directed
General Phelps to employ negroes, and cut down the timber and wood so as to clear that line.
He had a great number of escaped slaves in and about his camp.
Sometime before that, he had asked me to permit him to organize them into military companies and drill them and furnish arms and equipments for them.
I had told him it was impossible, because it was against the direct order of the
President, who had just disbanded some negro troops organized by
Hunter, and because the arms and equipments sent me were especially reserved for white troops only.
He replied that he was not fit for slave-driving or slave-catching, and declined to obey my orders.
Now I loved
General Phelps very much.
He was a crank upon the slavery question solely; otherwise he was as good a soldier and commander as ever mounted a horse.
I reasoned with him in every way. I showed him that Congress had just passed an act that forbade military companies to employ negroes, and now that we were at liberty to employ them, I wished he would go forward.
I begged him to do so, but he answered very decisively that he would not. Before this he had sent me a very long, eloquent, able, and well-put argument in favor of our negroes as troops, requesting that I forward it to the
President, which I did. If I had not been of his opinion before, I should have been fully convinced by that argument.
He wound up this communication by saying that his commission was in the hands of the
President.
I wrote to
Phelps that whatever might be my own opinions, I could not, where there was no sufficient emergency, act against the orders I had received from my superior.
As I gave the order for him to use the negroes in the way I directed, the matter was upon my conscience, not on his; he was the mere hand that executed it. I said, moreover, that I saw nothing of slave-catching or slave-driving in executing this command, especially as at
Washington our own soldiers had cut away the timber in
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front of
Arlington Heights, and in that they were neither slave-driven nor slaves.
He promptly refused to obey me, and sent in his resignation.
I had to refuse to accept it, and the whole matter was laid before the
President.
In the strongest language of which I was capable I represented to the
President my great desire to have
Phelps remain with me. They held the matter under advisement at
Washington.
I wished to satisfy myself that there was not to be any attack made upon us from the neighborhood of Manchac Pass.
Such an attack could not be made unless that pass was largely fortified by the enemy.
Accordingly, I permitted
Major Strong, at his request, to take two companies up towards Pontchatoula, where
Brig.-Gen. Jeff Thompson held his rebel camp.
With great courage and determination, and in the face of innumerable difficulties, Strong extended his reconnoissance up to Pontchatoula.
All the rebel troops ran away, and
Thompson had gone before that; and all Strong could do was to capture
Thompson's sword and spurs and destroy the other property and burn up some number of carloads of the provisions, as he had no means of bringing them away.
A more daring performance than that of Strong was not done during the war by anybody.
In the meantime I had become satisfied that the
French government had come to an understanding with
Mr. Seward and had broken off with
Mason and
Slidell; and that
Seward was to aid the
French Emperor in his attack on
Mexico.
That fact the man
Seward himself confessed by an order issued that no arms should be sold to go out of the country because all were wanted to arm our troops.
When the war commenced, very many thousands of guns had been bought with which to arm our troops until we should be able to make our own, which was very soon.
Most of those rifles had been discarded and sold to various dealers in arms.
They were not needed by us then, nor have they been used by us since.
Mexico, finding that she was to be invaded by the
French troops, sent into the
United States for those arms with which to arm her troops,--and they were certainly better than nothing.
When
Seward's order was made it was so worded as not to appear to be a thrust at
Mexico, for we were claiming to be friendly with
Mexico and against the
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French in the matter of putting a French emperor over her. Thus we were stabbing her in the back.
Soon afterwards I received information that one or more ships of the French fleet at
Martinique, under the command of
Admiral Reynaud (
Fox) of the
French navy, were coming to New Orleans.
In a little time
Admiral Reynaud appeared, bringing a communication from
Seward authorizing me to sell
Reynaud, if not inconsistent with the public service, some five to eight hundred draught mules, which he would pay for and receive at New Orleans for transportation.
I instantly understood what that meant.
There were no draught mules in
Mexico, and there were substantially none in all the
West India Islands.
There were plenty of pack mules in
Mexico, but heavy ordnance could not be carried on the back of pack mules from
Vera Cruz to the capital.
Scott had met with the same misadventure.
The
French Emperor wanted those mules to transport the munitions of war with which to besiege the city of
Mexico.
Now, I was honestly on the side of
Mexico, and as I was making preparations for an expedition into
Western Louisiana, I came to the conclusion that I could not, in consonance with the public service, sell my mules.
In other words, I determined the
French should not get a mule from me; and they did not. I called for reports from my quartermasters, and they all reported to me that it was impossible to spare a mule, and these reports I showed to the
French admiral.
I did not want any difficulties with the
French if I could help it. Therefore, after expressing my regret that I could not furnish the mules, I invited
Admiral Reynaud to take a trip with me down the river on my tour of inspection of
Forts Jackson and
St. Philip.
He said he would be very happy to go with me. I was happy to have him, because I knew that
General Weitzel, with the aid and under the inspection of
Col. E. F. Jones, who was in command of them, had put the forts in perfect equipment for defence.
We went down and thoroughly inspected the forts.
I showed the admiral how our guns in both forts would bear upon the river if anybody attempted to repeat the daring feat of
Farragut in running by them.
I descanted at length to him upon the mistake the enemy made in sending down fire-rafts to oppose us instead of putting them along on both sides of the river within range of the fire of the forts, and
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explained that in case a fleet came up the river now, at night, so the gunners of the forts couldn't see the vessels, the river would be lighted up by burning the fire-rafts along the banks so that every man on board the vessels would be plainly visible; and that
Farragut owed his success considerably to the fact his expedition was undertaken on a dark night.
I then showed him how
Farragut's fleet, giving him its weight of metal, could be posted just above the forts and cover the whole distance with the guns of the fleet, a thing which was not done by the rebel fleet.
After having explained all this to him, I said, semi-confidentially: “Now,
Admiral, what do you say; with these means of resistance properly handled with skilled gunners, do you believe that any fleet of the
British navy of wooden vessels could live to make that passage?”
He answered that it seemed to him that it would be impossible,
and, from the manner of his answer, I believed he thought: Neither could any French fleet. We had a good dinner and returned to New Orleans.
From that hour I had no fear of any attack on the city by the
French.
I desired to organize a special brigade to capture and occupy all the western part of
Louisiana and other places east of the
Red River, and to control the mines of salt deposit in New Iberia.
These mines could be approached by water, an advantage which
Jefferson put forth as one of the reasons for the purchase of
Louisiana.
I could get no reply from
Washington that I could have any reinforcements whatever.
I had gone as far as I could get in enlisting the former soldiers of the rebel army to strengthen the regiments I then had. Accordingly I sent a confidential message to
Washington saying that if they could not do anything for me by sending troops, I would call on
Africa for assistance,--i. e., I would enlist all the colored troops I could from the free negroes.
While I was waiting at
Ship Island, the rebel authorities in New Orleans had organized two regiments from the free negroes, called “Native Guards, colored.”
When
Lovell ran away with his troops these men stayed at home.
The rebels had allowed the company officers to be commissioned from colored men; but for the field officers,--colonels,
lieutenant-colonels, and majors, and the staff officers,--they were white men.
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I found out the names and residences of some twenty of these colored officers, and sent for them to call on me. They came, and a very intelligent looking set of men they were.
I asked them if they would like to be organized as part of the United States troops.
They unanimously said they would.
In all bodies of men there is always a spokesman, and while many of my guests were of a very light shade, that spokesman was a negro nearly as dark as the ace of spades.
“ General,” he asked, “shall we be officers as we were before?”
“Yes; every one of you who is fit to be an officer shall be, and all the line officers shall be colored men.”
“How soon do you want us to be ready?”
“How soon can you give me two regiments of a thousand men each?”
“In ten days.”
“But,” I said, “I want you to answer me one question.
My officers, most of them, believe that negroes won't fight.”
“Oh, but we will,” came from the whole of them.
“You seem to be an intelligent man,” said I, to their spokesman; “answer me this question: I have found out that you know just as well what this war is about as I do, and if the
United States succeed in it, it will put an end to slavery.”
They all looked assent.
“Then tell me why some negroes have not in this war struck a good blow somewhere for their freedom?
All over the
South the men have been conscripted and driven away to the armies, leaving ten negroes in some districts to one white man, and the colored men have simply gone on raising crops and taking care of their women and children.”
The man's countenance lighted up. He said:--
“You are General here, and I don't like to answer that question.”
“Answer it exactly according as the matter lies in your mind, and I pledge you my honor, whatever the answer may be it shall harm no one of you.”
“General, will you permit a question?”
“Yes.”
“If we colored men had risen to make war on our masters, would not it have been our duty to ourselves, they being our enemies, to kill the enemy wherever we could find them?
and all the white men would have been our enemies to be killed?”
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“I don't know but what you are right,” said I.
“I think that would be a logical necessity of insurrection.”
“If the colored men had begun such a war as that, General, which general of the United States army should we have called on to help us fight our battles?”
That was unanswerable.
“Well,” I said, “why do you think your men will fight?”
“General, we come of a fighting race.
Our fathers were brought here slaves because they were captured in war, and in hand to hand.
fights, too. We are willing to fight.
Pardon me, General, but the only cowardly blood we have got in our veins is the white blood.”
“Very well,” I said, “recruit your men and let them be mustered into the service at” --I mentioned a large public building--“in a fortnight from to-day, at ten o'clock in the morning.
Report, and I will meet you there.
I will give orders that the building be prepared.”
On that morning I went there and saw such a sight as I never saw before: Two thousand men ready to enlist as recruits, and not a man of them who had not a white “biled shirt” on.
 |
|
Changing sentinels of first colored troops in New Orleans, August, 1862, from an oil Painting. |
One regiment was mustered within fourteen days of the call, the first regiment of colored troops ever mustered into the service of the
United States during the
War of the
Rebellion, established and became soldiers of the
United States on the 22d day of August, 1862.
In a very short time three regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery were equipped, drilled, and ready for service.
Better soldiers never shouldered a musket.
They were intelligent, obedient, highly appreciative of their position, and fully maintained its dignity.
They easily learned the school of the soldier.
I
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observed a very remarkable trait about them.
They learned to handle arms and to march more readily than the most intelligent white men. My drillmaster could teach a regiment of negroes that much of the art of war sooner than he could have taught the same number of students from
Harvard or
Yale.
Why? Because the negro was already drilled.
The necessity of drills which seem interminable and never-ending to a civilian, is to teach recruits perfect and quick obedience to the word of command of their officer, and to obey that instantly and implicitly, whatever else may be happening to attract attention.
Now, from childhood up, the word of command had been implicitly and abjectly obeyed by the negro.
His master's voice was his perfect guide.
Again, they were exceedingly imitative.
Show them how to handle a musket and at once they imitated the movement as if they feared it might hurt them if they used it any other way. At first, indeed, the negro seemed quite as much afraid of the musket in his own hands as when in the hands of the enemy, but he soon learned to rely upon it as his defence, as was shown afterwards.
When in the field, being wounded, if he could bring himself off, however severely injured, he always brought his weapon off.
Again, their ear for time as well as tune was exceedingly apt; and it was wonderful with what accuracy and steadiness a company of negroes would march after a few days' instruction.
Again, white men, in case of sudden danger, seek safety by going apart each for himself.
The negroes always cling together for mutual protection.
They instinctively, and without needing so much drilling and experience as did white men, kept their camps neat and in better order.
I afterwards raised in
Virginia nearly three thousand negro cavalry.
While they could not easily be taught to ride with the dragoon-like precision of position of white men, yet it seemed quite impossible to unhorse them, especially those from plantations.
I had occasion to learn this.
In drilling them in a charge at full gallop over the rough and uneven plains, sometimes covered by ditches, it was rarely one was unhorsed.
But the prejudice against them among the white officers of the service was at first fearful, especially among the regulars.
Now they have become a part of the army of the United States; and as I
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write, the Ninth (colored) Cavalry, for good conduct in the field against the Indians, and for high soldierly bearing, are at
Fort Myers near
Washington, by the order of the War Department, exhibited to all comers as instances of the best qualities of the
American cavalry troops.
After I left New Orleans,
General Banks enlisted many more of them, but was weak enough to take away from them the great object of their ambition, under the, spur of which they were ready to fight to the death, namely,
equality with the white soldiers.
He was also unmanly enough to add injustice to that folly by taking the commissions from their line officers, which I had given them, and to brand their organizations with the stigma of a designation as a “Corps d'afrique.”
Yet, in spite of his unwisdom, they did equal service and laid down their lives at
Port Hudson in equal numbers comparatively with their white brothers in arms.
Of the folly, injustice, and stupidity of this class of prejudice I may speak in describing the events of the campaign of 1864.
I can now give a curious instance of the exhibition of this prejudice by one of the ablest men and best loved members of my staff, a life-long friend of whom I have heretofore spoken and shall hereafter speak in terms of affection, friendship, and admiring regard,
Gen. Godfrey Weitzel.
For his capacity, conduct, and skill, I had recommended
Weitzel for promotion from first lieutenant of engineers to brigadier-general for the purpose of putting him in command of an expedition of the most important character.
His great success in that, and his career afterwards during the whole war, fully justified the appointment.
On the 25th of October, I organized an expedition by a brigade composed of five regiments of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and four companies of cavalry.
This force was to move up the western bank of the
Mississippi and through
West Louisiana, for the purpose of capturing and occupying that territory and dispersing the forces assembled there under
Gen. Richard Taylor, and then to send a detachment to occupy
Galveston.
The plan was for
Weitzel to go up the river as far as
Donaldsonville, capture and fortify that point, move west of
Berwick Bay, and, with the aid of the light draught steamers which I had bought or captured, seize all the waters of
Southern Louisiana west of New Orleans.
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On the same day, I pushed forward from
Algiers a column consisting of the Eighth Vermont Volunteers and the First Regiment of Native Guards (colored). They were to proceed along the Opelousas Railroad to
Thibodeaux for the purpose of forwarding supplies to
Brashear City and
General Weitzel's expedition, and to give the loyal planters an opportunity to forward their sugar and cotton to New Orleans.
I believed that I could easily hold that portion of
Louisiana, by far the richest, and extend the movement so far as to cut off substantially all supplies from
Texas to the enemy the coming winter by this route, especially if I should receive early reinforcements.
The expedition from
Algiers was commanded by
Col. Stephen Thomas, of
Vermont.
No better or braver officer was there in my command to my knowledge.
Weitzel landed at
Donaldsonville on Sunday, October 26.
He soon found the enemy in force, and a sharp engagement ensued in which sixteen men and one officer were killed and seventy-three men wounded.
The enemy suffered largely: their commanding officer,
Colonel McPheeters, was killed; a large number of men were killed and wounded, and two hundred and sixty prisoners and one piece of artillery were captured.
I afterwards sent forward to aid
Colonel Thomas in opening the railroad, the Second Regiment of Native Guards (colored), under command of
Colonel Stafford.
Colonel Thomas, aided by the untiring labors of the colored troops, opened the Opelousas Railroad, rebuilt burned bridges, routed the enemy, and then was ordered to report to
Weitzel and form a portion of his force.
On the 1st of November I received a report from
General Weitzel that everything had been done which he had been ordered to do; that the
Native Guards had opened and picketed the Opelousas Railroad; and on the 2d he reported “the country as safe to travel now as Canal Street.”
But on the 5th of November I received a very surprising despatch from
Weitzel, from which I quote:--
. . . And now I desire, most respectfully, to decline the command of the district which has just been created, and which, as we have not yet secured a foot of ground on the Teche, ought properly to be called the District of La Fourche.
The reason I must decline is because accepting the command would place me in command of all the troops in the district,
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I cannot command those negro regiments.
The commanding general knows well my private opinions on this subject.
What I stated to him privately, while on his staff, I see now before my eyes.
Since the arrival of the negro regiments symptoms of servile insurrection are becoming apparent.
I could not, without breaking my brigade all up, put a force in every part of this district to keep down such an insurrection.
I cannot assume the command of such a force, and thus be responsible for its conduct.
I have no confidence in the organization.
Its moral effect in this community, which is stripped of nearly all its able-bodied men and will be stripped of a great many of its arms, is terrible.
Women and children, and even men, are in terror.
It is heart-rending, and I cannot make myself responsible for it. I will gladly go anywhere with my own brigade that you see fit to order me. I beg you therefore to keep the negro brigade directly under your own command or place some one over both mine and it.
He made a further communication:--
In still further confirmation of what I wrote to you in my despatches of this morning relative to servile insurrection, I have the honor to inform you that on the plantation of
Mr. David Pugh, a short distance above here, the negroes who have returned under the terms fixed upon by
Major-General Butler, without provocation or cause of any kind, refused this morning to work, and assaulted the overseer and
Mr. Pugh, injuring them severely, also a gentleman who came to the assistance of
Mr. Pugh.
Upon the plantation also of
Mr. W. J. Miner, on the Terre Bonne road, about sixteen miles from here, an outbreak has already occurred, and the entire community thereabout are in hourly expectation and terror of a general rising.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
My surprise may not be imagined when I received these reports from
Weitzel, especially that one in which he declared he would not obey my orders to command colored troops.
It will be observed that he states in justification of it only two reports of negroes quarrelling with their masters to whom they had
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been returned, in one case the overseer and the master being injured in the difficulty and the other case being a mere rumor.
Not a word as to any misconduct of a single colored soldier.
With a bleeding heart lest
Weitzel might still be so far misled as to disobey my orders, after reasoning with him upon his conduct, I wrote an order leaving him no option but to obey it — which he did — as follows:--
You say that in these organizations you have no confidence.
As your reading must have made you aware, General Jackson entertained a different opinion upon that subject.
It was arranged between the commanding general and yourself, that the colored regiments should be employed in guarding the railroad.
You don't complain, in your report, that they either failed in this duty, or that they have acted otherwise than correctly and obediently to the commands of their officers, or that they have committed any outrage or pillage upon the inhabitants.
The general was aware of your opinion, that colored men will not fight.
You have failed to show, by the conduct of these free men, so far, anything to sustain that opinion.
And the general cannot see why you should decline the command, especially as you express a willingness to go forward to meet the only organized enemy with your brigade alone, without further support.
The commanding general cannot see how the fact that they are guarding your line of communication by railroad, can weaken your defence.
He must, therefore, look to the other reasons stated by you, for an explanation of your declining the command.
You say that since the arrival of the negro regiment you have seen symptoms of a servile insurrection.
But, as the only regiment that arrived there got there as soon as your own command, of course the appearance of such symptoms is since their arrival.
Have you not mistaken the cause?
Is it the arrival of a negro regiment, or is it the arrival of United States troops, carrying by the act of Congress freedom to this servile race?
Did you expect to march into that country, drained, as you say it is, by conscription of all its able-bodied white men, without leaving the negroes free to show symptoms of servile insurrection?
Does not this state of things arise from the very fact of war itself?
You are in a country where now the negroes outnumber the whites ten to one, and these whites are in rebellion against the government, or in terror seeking its protection.
Upon reflection, can you doubt that the same state of things would have arisen without the presence of a colored regiment?
Did you not see symptoms of the same things
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upon the plantations here upon our arrival, although under much less favorable circumstances for revolt?
You say that the prospect of such an insurrection is heart-rending, and that you cannot be responsible for it. The responsibility rests upon those who have begun and carried out this war, and who have stopped at no barbarity, at no act of outrage, upon the citizens and soldiers of the United States.
You have forwarded me the records of a pretended court-martial, showing that seven men of one of your regiments, who enlisted here in the Eighth Vermont, who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war, were in cold blood murdered, and, as certain information shows me, required to dig their own graves!
You are asked if this is not an occurrence as heart-rending as a prospective servile insurrection.
The question is now to be met, whether in a hostile, rebellious part of the State where these very murders have been committed by the militia, you are to stop in the operations of the field to put down servile insurrection, because the men and women are terror-stricken?
Whenever was it heard before that a victorious general, in an unsurrendered province, stopped in his course for the purpose of preventing the rebellious inhabitants of that province from destroying each other, or refuse to take command of a conquered province lest he should be made responsible for their self-destruction?
As a military question, perhaps, the more terror-stricken the inhabitants are that are left in your rear, the more safe will be your lines of communication.
You say there have appeared before your eyes the very facts, in terror-stricken women and children and men, which you had before contemplated in theory.
Grant it. But is not the remedy to be found in the surrender of the neighbors, fathers, brothers, and sons of the terror-stricken women and children, who are now in arms against the government within twenty miles of you?
And, when that is done, and you have no longer to fear from these organized forces, and they have returned peaceably to their homes, you will be able to use the full power of your troops to insure your safety from the so-much-feared (by them, not by you) servile insurrection.
If you desire, you can send a flag of truce to the commander of these forces, embracing these views, and placing upon him the responsibility which belongs to him. Even that course will not remove it from you, for upon you it has never rested.
Say to them, that if all armed opposition to the authority of the United States shall cease in Louisiana, on the west bank of the river, you are authorized by the commanding general to say, that the same protection against negro or other violence will be
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afforded that part of Louisiana, that has been in the part already in the possession of the United States.
If that is refused, whatever may ensue is upon them, and not upon you or upon the United States.
You will have done all that is required of a brave, humane man, to avert from these deluded people the horrible consequences of their insane war upon the government. . . .
Consider this case.
General Bragg is at liberty to ravage the houses of our brethren of Kentucky because the Union army of Louisiana is protecting his wife and his home against his negroes.
Without that protection he would have to come back to take care of his wife, his home, and his negroes.
It is understood that Mrs. Bragg is one of the terrified women of whom you speak in your report.
This subject is not for the first time under the consideration of the commanding general.
When in command of the Department of Annapolis, in May, 1861, he was asked to protect a community against the consequences of a servile insurrection.
He replied, that when that community laid down its arms and called upon him for protection, he would give it, because from that moment between them and him war would cease.
The same principle initiated there will govern his and your actions now; and you will afford such protection as soon as the community through its organized rulers shall ask it.
. . . In the meantime, these colored regiments of free men, raised by the authority of the President, and approved by him as the commander-in-chief of the army, must be commanded by the officers of the Army of the United States, like any other regiments.
About thirty days after, when I was relieved from command in New Orleans, I left
General Weitzel in full command of the richest portion of
Louisiana, having the crops gathered, housed, and taken charge of for the benefit of whomever it might concern, by the commission relating to confiscated property, the action of which I have before set forth.
Afterwards I procured the appointment of
Weitzel as major-general under my command in the Department of Virginia, in 1864, and he had the singular felicity of marching from my old headquarters his Twenty-Fifth Corps, composed wholly of colored troops, into
Richmond when
Lee evacuated it, and of holding it in their possession, the black above the white, to receive the first visit of
Abraham Lincoln,
President of the
United States, to the captured rebel capital.
His flag was raised by a negro.
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Early in July, 1862, I was informed that the enemy were attempting to so fortify Manchac Pass as to protect the trestle-work of the railroad passing through it, in order to afford them communication in the rear of the city.
Thereupon I ordered
Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball of the Twelfth Maine Volunteers to take a small portion of his regiment with the gunboat
New London and make an attack on the rebel forces there.
It was done.
The rebels were driven from their battery by assault, and followed far up into the country.
Their works were all destroyed; their bridge they had to burn behind them, and their guns were captured and brought away with a very considerable loss.
Their colors were captured, and I recommended to the War Department that the regiment be allowed to retain the captured colors as a mark of its commendation of their valor, which was done, as set forth in the following
General Order:--
headquarters Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, July 24, 1862.
General Order No. 51.
The
commanding general of this department takes pleasure in publishing the following indorsement from
Washington of what he has considered the useful services of
Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball, of the Twelfth Regiment of Maine Volunteers, and the troops under his command:
The news of the brilliant achievement of
Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball of the Twelfth Maine Volunteers, and the brave men under his command, at Manchac Pass, was very gratifying to the Department, and it entirely approves your action in allowing the regiment to retain the colors which they had so gallantly taken from the enemy.
By command of
I have now set out, I believe, all the military movements of the Army of the Gulf under my command.
In none were we unsuccessful, in none did we lose any considerable number of men. We lost fewer men by disease than any other army in any field, although we were in the hotbed of poisonous malaria and death.
In every exigency of the government of the people
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we met with no disaster; and the whole that was done, I cannot better sum up than I did in my farewell address to my comrades in arms:--
headquarters Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, Dec. 15, 1862.
General Order No. 106.
Soldiers of the Army of the Gulf:--
Relieved from further duties in this department by direction of the
President, under the date of Nov. 9, 1862, I take leave of you by this final order, it being impossible to visit your scattered outposts, covering hundreds of miles of the frontier of a larger territory than some kingdoms of
Europe.
I greet you, my brave comrades, and say farewell!
This word, endeared as you are by a community of privations, hardships, dangers, victories, successes, military and civil, is the only sorrowful thought I have.
You have deserved well of your country.
Without a murmur you sustained an encampment on a sand bar, so desolate that banishment to it, with every care and comfort possible, has been the most dreaded punishment inflicted upon your bitterest and most insulting enemies.
You had so little transportation, that but a handful could advance to compel submission by the
Queen City of the
Rebellion, whilst others waded breast-deep in the marshes which surround
St. Philip, and forced the surrender of a fort deemed impregnable to land attack by the most skilful engineers of your country and her enemy.
At your occupation, order, law, quiet, and peace sprang to this city, filled with the bravos of all nations, where for a score of years, during the profoundest peace, human life was scarcely safe at noon-day.
By your discipline you illustrated the best traits of the
American soldier, and enchained the admiration of those that came to scoff.
Landing with a military chest containing but seventy-five dollars, from the hoards of a rebel government you have given to your country's treasury nearly a half million of dollars, and so supplied yourselves with the needs of your service that your expedition has cost your government
less by four fifths than any other.
You have fed the starving poor, the wives and children of your enemies, so converting enemies into friends, that they have sent their representatives to your Congress, by a vote greater than your entire numbers, from districts in which, when you entered, you were tauntingly told that there was “no one to raise your flag.”
By your practical philanthropy you have won the confidence of the “oppressed race” and the slave.
Hailing you as deliverers, they are
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ready to aid you as willing servants, faithful laborers, or, using the tactics taught them by your enemies, to fight with you in the field.
By steady attention to the laws of health, you have stayed the pestilence, and, humble instruments in the hands of God, you have demonstrated the necessity that His creatures should obey His laws, and, reaping His blessing in this most unhealthy climate, you have preserved your ranks fuller than those of any other battalions of the same length of service.
You have met double numbers of the enemy, and defeated him in the open field; but I need not further enlarge on this topic.
You were sent here to do that.
I commend you to your commander.
You are worthy of his love, Farewell, my comrades!
again farewell!
The true history of the Army of the Gulf as set forth in the above order has now been published for more than twenty-eight years, and never has been questioned either by friends or foes.
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