and did not then give way until the troops on our right and left had been broken, and we were entirely outflanked and almost surrounded. The regiment was then compelled, in a great measure, to cut its way out. Of the firmness, coolness and courage of the men under a heavy fire, it will be unnecessary for me to speak, as they were almost constantly during the battle under the immediate eye of the General commanding the division. The regiment went into battle on the second day, under the command of First Lieut. G. W. Crosby, of company E, and as I am well assured, nobly maintained the honor of our flag. Should I designate meritorious officers, I should have to name nearly every officer in the regiment. I think, however, none will feel envious if I specially mention Lieut. Crosby. I desire to call the attention of the General commanding the division to the gallantry and good conduct of Sergeant James Lakin, of company F, who carried the colors on the first day; and of Corporal Anderson Edwards, of company I, who carried the colors on the second day of the battle. Our loss is heavy. I herewith enclose a list of our killed, wounded and missing. I have the honor to remain, sir, Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
M. M. Trumbull, Capt. Third Iowa Infantry, Comd'g Regiment.
Gen. Beauregard's (rebel) report.
headquarters of the army of the Mississippi, Corinth, Miss., April 11, 1862.General: On the second ultimo, having ascertained conclusively, from the movements of the enemy on the Tennessee River, and from reliable sources of information, that his aim would be to cut off my communications in West-Tennessee with the Eastern and Southern States, by operating from the Tennessee River, between Crump's Landing and Eastport, as a base, I determined to foil his designs by concentrating all my available forces at and around Corinth. Meanwhile, having called on the Governors of the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, to furnish additional troops, some of them, chiefly regiments from Louisiana, soon reached this vicinity, and with two divisions of Gen. Polk's command from Columbus, and a fine corps of troops from Mobile and Pensacola, under Maj.-Gen. Bragg, constituted the army of the Mississippi. At the same time, Gen. Johnston, being at Murfreesboro, on the march to form a junction of his forces with mine, was called on to send at least a brigade by railroad, so that we might fall on and crush the enemy should he attempt an advance from under his gunboats. The call on Gen. Johnston was promptly complied with. His entire force was also hastened in this direction, and by the first of April our united forces were concentrated along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, from Bethel to Corinth, and on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, from Corinth to Iuka. It was then determined to assume the offensive and strike a sudden blow at the enemy in position under Gen. Grant, on the west bank of the Tennessee, at Pittsburgh and in the direction of Savannah, before he was reinforced by the army under Gen. Buell, then known to be advancing for that purpose by rapid marches from Nashville via Columbia. About the same time Gen. Johnston was advised that such an operation conformed to the expectations of the President. By a rapid and vigorous attack on Gen. Grant, it was expected he would be beaten back into his transports and the river, or captured, in time to enable us to profit by the victory, and remove to the rear all the stores and munitions that would fall into our hands in such an event, before the arrival of Gen. Buell's army on the scene. It was never contemplated, however, to retain the position thus gained, and abandon Corinth, the strategic point of the campaign. Want of proper officers, needful for the proper organization of divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together, and other difficulties in the way of an effective organization, delayed the movement until the night of the second inst., when it was heard from a reliable quarter that the junction of the enemy's armies was near at hand. It was then, at a late hour, determined that the attack should be attempted at once, incomplete and imperfect as were our preparations for such a grave and momentous adventure. Accordingly, that night, at one o'clock A. M., the preliminary orders to the commanders of corps were issued for the movement. On the following morning the detailed orders of movement, a copy of which is herewith marked “A,” were issued, and the movement, after some delay, commenced — the troops being in admirable spirits. It was expected we should be able to reach the enemy's lines in time to attack them early on the fifth instant. The men, however, for the most part, were unused to marching — the roads narrow, and traversing a densely wooded country, became almost impassable after a severe rain-storm on the night of the fourth, which drenched the troops in bivouac; hence our forces did not reach the intersection of the roads from Pittsburgh and Hamburgh, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, until late Saturday afternoon. It was then decided that the attack should be made on the next morning, at the earliest hour practicable, in accordance with the orders of movement — that is, in three lines of battle: the first and second extending from Owl Creek on the left to Lick Creek on the right — a distance of about three miles--supported by the third and the reserve. The first line, under Maj. Gen. Hardee, was constituted of his corps, augmented on his right by Gladden's brigade of Maj.-Gen. Bragg's corps, deployed in line of battle, with their respective artillery, following immediately by the main road to Pittsburgh, and the cavalry in rear of the wings. The second line, composed of the other troops of Bragg's corps, followed the first at a distance of five hundred yards, in the same order as the first. The army corps under Gen.