accumulated, and created a temptation for an attack that had not before existed. I warned the officers at Gen. Buell's headquarters of the necessity of increasing my force. I begged them for cavalry to scour the country, but especially for artillery. Gov. Johnson tried to obtain for me even a section of a battery, but failed. I telegraphed to Colonel Lowe, at Fort Henry, and to Lieut.-Col. Olney, at Paducah, for assistance; the latter started a battery on a boat, but it could not get up the river, and returned. I telegraphed to Gen. Grant, as did also Col. Lowe; the General telegraphed me to give notice to Nashville of a day when I would leave the post, and to move on that day. I gave this notice, and visited Nashville a few days after, to represent matters at headquarters. Major Seidell, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, urged me to remain, stating that Gen. Buell had requested General Grant to countermand his order. I finally agreed to await the result, but told him that while I thought I could hold any camp against infantry, that I was in no condition to sustain an artillery attack; that I was fully advised of the strength of the enemy, and that I was advised by Lieut.-Col. Bristow, of the Kentucky cavalry, that they intended to attack Clarksville. That, while I was willing to do the best I could, I would not hold myself responsible for the post. He still urged me to remain. On the day I had fixed for my departure, I received an order from Gen. Grant to remain. The day I was in Nashville, Gov. Johnson also telegraphed Gen. Halleck, recommending that I should be allowed to bring the remainder of my regiment from Fort Donelson to Clarksville. So matters remained, becoming more and more threatening, of which they were fully advised at Nashville. On Monday morning I received notice of the approach of the enemy in force. I was near my headquarters in the city, and immediately started for camp, which I reached just as the enemy galloped down the street. I found Lieut.-Col. Andrews, who was in command, forming the men in position. The enemy halted out of range, and sent in a flag of truce, demanding a surrender. I called my officers together, and submitted the proposition to them. The matter was some time in consideration. Pending the negotiation, I asked and obtained leave to send Lieut.-Col. Andrews along the line to verify their statements of their force. He counted them to the number of about eight hundred, well armed, one company with volcanic rifles, ( “sixteen-shooters,” ) one with carbines, some with muskets, and the remainder with double-barreled shot-guns. Besides this number, they were joined by citizens, variously armed, making their entire force about one thousand or one thousand one hundred; and this increasing every hour, by a constant stream of people coining in from the country. They had, besides, a battery of four guns, six and twelve-pounders. To oppose this force, the officers reported to me one hundred and ten men, in all one hundred and fifty-two men, with no artillery, except a little gun picked up at the rolling-mill, and of no account whatever. We had relied on holding the college, about which we were encamped, against infantry; but its walls were only thick enough to explode a shell as it passed through them. We had thrown up some rifle-pits to guard the open approach, but had nothing that could be called “fortifications.” Our total nominal force was about two hundred and ninety enlisted men; but we had four detachments of six to eight each up the river, guarding boats; another down the railroad, and another guarding the wharf, telegraph-office, commissary and quartermaster's warehouses, and the stables; so that the total force in camp, as reported to me, was only one hundred and fifty-two men. The officers first voted part for surrender and part against it. I told them that we would then fight for it, and started for the flag of truce. While we were talking, Lieut.-Colonel Andrews came to me and said the officers were now unanimous in their recommendation for surrender, and I asked an interview with Col. Woodward, which resulted in our capitulation. The question for my consideration was a simple one. On the one hand I had the strongest possible motives for desiring to make a desperate resistance; on the other hand, my conviction that we could not hold the building against an artillery attack, and that we could not stand a siege I knew, for we had not sufficient supplies of either water or food. My men out of camp were all prisoners, and I could see nothing for it but surrender, either before the fighting or after. I had needlessly, and against my own judgment, sacrificed the lives of my men. My duty, I thought then, and I think so now, was plain; and terrible as have been the results to myself, I am sure that my conscience could again, under like circumstances, demand a similar action. I knew, as the Louisville Democrat suggests, that I had an opportunity to retrieve my good name, but I have never permitted a selfish consideration to influence my conduct on a matter of public duty; and as God is my helper, I trust I never may. Had I for such motives sacrificed the lives of my brave men uselessly, I should have received, as I would have deserved, the execrations of the very men who now, for other reasons, traduce me, and I should not have been sustained by the voice of my own conscience. The telegraph says I am to be dismissed from the service. Should this even be so, I am ready to meet even that. I can at least then, if discharged from my parole, renter the service, as on the day after the President's proclamation I first entered it, as a private soldier, and I shall then ask all those now censuring me to go with me, and let us see which can look death most calmly in the face. If then, responsible for my own life only, I falter, let them indeed call me a coward.
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Statement of company officers.The undersigned, commissioned officers of the line, who were at Clarksville, Tenn., on duty at the time of the surrender, have read with deep
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