part of November, 1862, that he believed General Hooker's division would have been driven in by the impetuosity of the enemy, had he not sent the best regiment of his corps (Colonel Owen, Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania volunteers) to the support of that General. This en passant. But what makes the official report of General Heintzelman appear a little singular is the fact that General Hooker, who commanded a division of Heintzelman's corps, in his official report to Heintzelman himself, makes this statement: “About three o'clock the enemy commenced a vigorous attack on McCall.” (See rebellion record, Vol. V. p. 260.) Thus, both Sumner and Hooker being in my immediate vicinity, and their unasked testimony as to the hour at which my division was attacked agreeing with my own official report, it is rendered patent that my division was attacked at three o'clock P. M., and not at five o'clock P. M., as reported by General McClellan. With respect to my division having given way in less than an hour, I need only say that, as the testimony of every officer commanding a regiment and many others of the division proving the assertion to be unfounded, has been published heretofore in my report, I shall now only refer to the frank and manly testimony of General Meade, in a letter to me, dated Camp Warrenton, Virginia, November seventh, 1862: “. . . . It was only the stubborn resistance offered by our division, (the Pennsylvania reserves,) prolonging the contest till after dark, and checking till that time the advance of the enemy, that enabled the concentration during the night of the whole army on James River, which saved it.” (See printed report.) It is thus rendered equally patent that my division did not give way in less than an hour, but fought till night put an end to the battle. The foregoing are my grounds for declaring the aforesaid passage in General McClellan's report to be not in accordance with facts. There is another passage in General McClellan's report — the one immediately preceding that just discussed — in which he makes it appear that “my division was reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier forces accumulated upon them,” and quotes my report. Whether my report was misquoted or miscopied I cannot pretend to say; but I certainly did not intend to convey that idea. What I did mean to convey is this: That the two regiments (Fourth and Seventh) of Meade's brigade, in support of Randall's battery “were reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated upon them.” And this will appear to every impartial reader when he reads in the next sentence of my report these emphatic words: “The centre of my division was still engaged.” . . This sentence General McClellan ignores and omits, and of course the impression intended to be left on the public mind is, that I had stated in my report that my division was compelled to give way. This was not my intention, certainly. The truth is, when Randall's battery, on the right of the division, was captured in my presence, I rode to the centre of the division in order to bring up a sufficient force to recover the battery which still lay upon its own ground, some of the guns overturned and surrounded by forty odd dead horses; but I found the centre so hotly engaged as to demand all my attention and solicitude until the attack at that point should be repelled, which in a short time I had the satisfaction to witness, with the capture of the standard of the Tenth Alabama. In the mean time Randall's battery was recaptured by Lieutenant-Colonel Bollinger, of the Seventh, “after one of the guns had been turned upon him and its contents fired into his ranks.” (See his — Bollinger's — testimony in my printed report.) And I now assert that the division was not compelled to give way, as stated by General McClellan. On the same page with the foregoing (137) General McClellan states: “General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our own men in front. Captain De Russy's battery was placed on the right of General Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods.” It is necessary, in order that the foregoing statement may be understood, to explain to the reader that it is a quotation from General Heintzelman's report, (Heintzelman himself having “placed De Russy's battery,” ) and refers to an earlier part of the action, when Seymour's brigade of my division fell back on Sumner, and before Randall's battery was attacked. Indeed, McClellan's report of this battle is rather obscure and unintelligible to one not present; but the reader is recommended to compare the above from McClellan's report, page 137, with Heintzelman's report in the companion volume rebellion record, p. 276. The history of this affair is as follows: When Seymour's brigade was driven in, the greater part were re-formed by their colonels in rear of their own ground; the lesser part fell back on Generals Sumner and Hooker, carrying with them some (200) two hundred prisoners just taken by them. On the strength of this display of retiring forces, General Hooker reported officially that McCall's “whole division was completely routed,” etc. On the same data, General Sumner told me in Washington, early in November, 1862: “I saw your men coming out of the woods; but in a few minutes I saw they were stragglers, and I thought no more about it.” Sumner was a brave and honorable man; and he would have scorned to say more or less than the truth. Peace to his ashes, in the name of God, amen! In reference to this stage of the battle, when the enemy, following the left portion of Seymour's men, fell upon Sumner and Hooker, the latter states in his report that he “rolled the enemy back, and passing Sumner's front, they were by him hurriedly thrown over on to Kearny.” The gallant General might have said, without much stretch of the hyperbole, that the
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