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Doc. 21.-operations in Virginia.

Major-General Meade's reports.

headquarters army of the Potomac, December 6, 1863.
Adjutant-General of the Army:
I have the honor to submit for the information of the General-in-Chief the following report of the operations of this army since the date (July thirty-first) at which the report of the Gettysburgh campaign was concluded. At that date the army was in position on the north bank of the Rappahannock, the enemy being in position about Culpeper Court-House, and between the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers. The instructions of the General-in-Chief required the army should maintain this position, assuming a threatening attitude toward the enemy. On the first of August, Brigadier-General Buford, in command of a division of cavalry, advanced from Rappahannock Station, and drove the enemy's cavalry to the vicinity of Culpeper Court-House, where a strong force of infantry being met, Buford was obliged to retire. This reconnoissance, it is believed, had the effect to cause the enemy to withdraw his infantry to the south side of the Rapidan.

About the middle of August a considerable detachment was withdrawn from this army under the orders of the General-in-Chief, for duty elsewhere. On the first of September Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, commanding a division of cavalry, proceeded to Port Conway, on the Lower Rappahannock, where, after driving across the river a force of cavalry and infantry which the enemy had on the north bank, he, by means of his artillery, effectually destroyed the two gun-boats, recently captured by the enemy on the Potomac, and which they had brought to this point.

On the thirteenth of September, intelligence having been received rendering it probable the enemy was making a retrograde movement, Major-General Pleasanton, in command of all the cavalry, supported by the Second corps, Major-General Warren, crossed the Rappahannock at several points, and after a spirited engagement with the enemy's cavalry, in which he captured two guns and many prisoners, drove the enemy across the Rapidan, but found it impossible to force the passage of that river. Major-General Warren, with his corps, occupied Culpeper Court-House, taking no part in the engagement, which was entirely a cavalry fight. The result of this movement proved that the enemy had sent Longstreet's corps to the south-west, but still held the line of the Rapidan in force.

On the sixteenth of September the army crossed the Rappahannock and took up a position around Culpeper Court-House, with the advance of two corps on the Rapidan. An examination of the enemy's position proved it entirely out of the question to attempt to force the passage of the river in his immediate front

The command of all fords was on the south bank, and this obstacle was greatly increased by numerous earthworks and rifle-pits, with batteries in position.

Just as a plan of operations for a flank movement had been matured, it was thought proper to withdraw from the army the Eleventh and Twelfth corps for duty in the South-West; these corps leaving on the twenty-fourth of September. Early in October a portion of the troops withdrawn in August were returned, and about the same time considerable accessions to the force under my command were made by drafted men. On the tenth of October, information being received leading to the belief the enemy was about to make some movement, Brigadier-General Buford was sent across the Rapidan with his division of cavalry, with orders to uncover, if practicable, the upper fords, when the First and Sixth corps, in advance on the river, were ordered to force the passages at these points.

On the tenth, before intelligence of Buford's movements were received, the enemy crossed to Robertson's River, and advanced from Madison Court-House in heavy force, driving in my cavalry. The indications of the enemy's purpose to pass my flanks, and threaten my rear being conclusive, on the eleventh of October the army was withdrawn to the north side of the Rappahannock.

In effecting this operation, the enemy followed the rear-guard of cavalry under Major-General Pleasanton, engaging him from Culpeper CourtHouse to Brandy Station, where, when General Pleasanton being reinforced by Buford, (who had been compelled to recross the Rapidan, after proceeding as far as Morton's Ford,) the enemy was held in check till evening, when the cavalry withdrew.

The reports of the officers with the rear-guard leading me to believe the enemy occupied Culpeper, on the twelfth of October the Sixth, Fifth, and Second corps recrossed the Rappahannock, advancing as far as Brandy Station, while Buford's cavalry drove a small force of the enemy into Culpeper. During the night despatches were received from General Gregg, commanding a cavalry division guarding the upper fords of the Rappahannock and Hazel rivers, that he had been forced back early in the morning from Hazel River, and in the afternoon from Rappahannock, and that the enemy were crossing at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo in heavy force. As it was too late when this intelligence reached me to attempt to gain Warrenton in advance of the enemy, the army on the thirteenth was withdrawn to Auburn and Catlett's Station, and on the fourteenth to Centreville. This retrograde movement was effected without molestation from the enemy till the fourteenth, on.which day he skirmished at Auburn with the Second corps, Major-General Warren, and on the afternoon of that day attacked General Warren at Bristol Station. The attack was most handsomely repulsed by General Warren, who captured five pieces of artillery and some four hundred and fifty prisoners. [263]

On the fifteenth of October, the army remained in position at Centreville, the enemy's cavalry and artillery advancing and skirmishing with the Second corps at Blackburn's Ford, and the Third corps at Liberty Mills.

Finding the enemy did not advance beyond Broad River, I was about recrossing Bull Run, when on the sixteenth a severe rain-storm occurred, which rendered Bull Run unfordable and required the sending for the pontoon-bridges, which were in the rear with the main supply-train of the army.

On the seventeenth, the enemy's cavalry appeared on my right flank, with artillery and reported infantry, indicating a farther attempt to outflank my position; at the same time, reports from prisoners and deserters indicated a movement on the part of the enemy.

The eighteenth was spent in efforts to ascertain the precise position of the enemy, which resulting in the conviction he was retiring, the army was put in motion on the nineteenth, and advanced to Gainesville. Brigadier-General Kilpatrick in the advance drove the enemy's cavalry through Buckland Mills, beyond which he advanced with one brigade as far as New-Baltimore, when a division of the enemy's cavalry came up from Auburn and endeavored to cut off his retreat; General Kilpatrick, however, extricated himself by taking a road to Haymarket, but not without considerable loss, from the superior numbers he was engaged with.

On the twentieth, the army occupied Warrenton without opposition, the enemy retiring to the south bank of the Rappahannock. It was then ascertained the enemy had completely destroyed the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Bristol Station to the Rappahannock. Through the energy and skill of Colonel McCallum, Superintendent of Military Railroads, the road was put in order to Warrenton Junction by the second of November. At this period I submitted to the General-in-Chief the “project” of seizing by a prompt movement the heights of Fredericksburgh, and transferring the base of operations to the Fredericksburgh Railroad. This not meeting the approval of the General-in-Chief, on the fourth of November the army was put in motion to force the passage of the Rappahannock. Major-General Sedgwick, in command of the Sixth and Fifth corps, advanced to Rappahannock Station, where the enemy were intrenched on the north bank of the river. Major-General Sedgwick attacked and carried the enemy's works, on the north bank, capturing four pieces of artillery and some sixteen hundred prisoners. Major-General French, commanding the Third, Second, and First corps, marched to Kelly's Ford, where the advance of the Third corps gallantly forced the passage to the ford, taking the enemy's works on the other side and capturing some four hundred prisoners. Finding himself surprised, and the passage of the river secured, the enemy withdrew during the night. The next day, November eighth, the pursuit was begun from Kelly's Ford; but owing to a fog prevailing, preventing Major-General Sedgwick from ascertaining whether the enemy had evacuated his front, the column from Kelly's Ford was obliged to move over to the railroad, to secure the opening of the river at Rappahannock Station. The pursuit was continued to Brandy Station, the cavalry proceeding to Culpeper, where it was ascertained the enemy had retired to his old position on the Rapidan.

A position was taken up from Kelly's Ford through Brandy Station to Welford's Ford, and work immediately commenced on the repairs of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to the Rappahannock. By the sixteenth of November, the road was put in order, the bridge built over the Rappahannock, and by the nineteenth of November the sidings of a depot at Brandy Station were constructed, and supplies for the use of the army brought up and delivered. As the subsequent operations of the army were important, and I desire to narrate them in more detail, I shall submit them in a special report.

The casualties occurring in the several affairs herein reported were transmitted to your office at the several times of their occurrence.

Very respectfully,

George G. Meade, Major-General Commanding.

Operations at mine Run.

headquarters army of the Potomac, December 7, 1863.
Adjutant-General of the Army:
My last reports of the operations of this army included the twentieth ultimo. I have now to submit in continuance of that communication the following report of subsequent operations to the present date:

The railroad and the depot at Brandy Station being completed, and all the necessary wants of the army supplied, arrangements were at once made for an advance. The position of the enemy was known to be behind his strong intrenchments on the Rapidan. These were known to extend from the junction of the Rapidan and Rappahannock River to a point as high up as Liberty Mills, west of Orange Court-House. An attack in front had long been impracticable, and the instructions of the General-in-Chief confined my operations to such tactical manoeuvres as my judgment dictated. A movement, therefore, to immediately turn either flank of the enemy was the question to be decided. I ascertained from reliable sources that the enemy had abandoned the design of guarding the lower fords, but relied for the protection of his right flank on an intrenched line he had constructed perpendicular to the Rapidan, leaving it at Morton's Ford, and extending as far as Bartlett's Mill, on the road from Robertson's Tavern to Raccoon F )rd. I could hear of no works or defences on the Orange and Fredericksburgh turnpike or plank-road. Ewell's corps, estimated between twentyfive and thirty thousand men, held the line from Bartlett's Mill to near Rapidan Station; and Hill's corps, over twenty-five thousand strong. [264] held the left, from Rapidan Station to Liberty Mills. The plan I decided on was to cross the Rapidan at the lower fords in three columns, and by a prompt movement seize the plank-road and turnpike, advancing rapidly toward Orange Court-House, thus turning the enemy's works and compelling him to give battle on ground not previously selected or prepared. And I indulged in the hope that in the execution of this plan I should be enabled to fall on part of the enemy's forces before he could effect a concentration, and thus so cripple him as to render more certain the success of the final struggle. In accordance with this plan orders were issued on the twenty-third for the movement. A storm occurring during the night of the twenty-third, the orders were postponed till the morning of the twenty-sixth, at six A. M. of which day the several columns were directed to move.

Major-General French, commanding the Third corps, was directed to proceed with his corps to Jacob's Mill, cross the Rapidan at that point, and continue his march by a road known to exist from Jacob's Mill to Robertson's Tavern, where he would effect a junction with the Second corps. Major-General Warren was ordered to cross at Germania Ford and take the turnpike to Robertson's Tavern. The Fifth corps, Major-General Sykes, was directed to cross at Culpeper Ford, and taking the plank-road, to continue his march as far as Parker's Store, and if practicable, to the crossing of the road from Robertson's Tavern. A division of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Gregg, was ordered to cross at Ely's Ford, and proceed on the Catharpin road as far as Corbin's bridge, to cover the left flank of the army. A division of cavalry, under General Custer, held the upper fords of the Rapidan; and the Third division, under General Merritt, was ordered to guard the trains assembled at Richardsville. Anticipating an attempt on the part of the enemy to check the heads of columns until he could get in position, and looking for this attack first on my right flank, the nearest to his known position, I ordered the Sixth corps, Major-General Sedgwick, to follow the Third, thus placing considerably more than half my infantry on the right flank, and directed Major-General Newton, commanding two divisions of the First corps, (the Third division being left on the railroad,) to follow the Fifth corps, thus reenforcing the left flank, leaving the centre to be supported from either of the other two columns, as circumstances might render the most convenient.

In accordance with the above order the troops were put in motion at six A. M. of the twenty-sixth, the heads of column of the Fifth and Second corps reaching the river between nine and ten A. M. ; but the Third corps, from causes not yet explained, not getting to Jacob's Mills till after twelve M., and thus delaying the other two corps, the advance being directed to be simultaneous. This delay of the Third corps, together with physical obstacles arising from the steep banks of the Rapidan at all the crossings, proved fatal to the design of having the heads of columns reach Robertson's Tavern and its vicinity by the night of the twenty-sixth, as was expected, the corps all crossing, but the heads of columns only proceeding a mile or two before bivouacking.

Orders were issued for the columns to move at early daylight on the twenty-seventh, and resume the march as previously indicated.

The Second corps arrived at Robertson's Tavern about ten A. M., driving the enemy's skirmishers for some distance before reaching it, and at the tavern coming into the presence of a considerable force of the enemy, said by prisoners to be parts of two divisions of Ewell's corps. At this point I directed General Warren to halt and maintain his ground until connection was made with the Third corps, momentarily expected. About eleven A. M. a communication was received from General French to the effect “that the head of his column was near the plank-road, and that he was waiting for General Warren.” A reply was immediately sent to him to push on promptly, and he would find General Warren at Robertson's Tavern, there engaged with the enemy, and requiring his support. Several officers were sent to communicate with General French, and to urge him forward. About one P. M. a dispatch was received from General French saying the enemy were throwing a force to his right flank on the Raccoon Ford road. On the receipt of this a peremptory order was sent to General French to move forward at once, and that if the enemy interposed to attack with his whole force, at all hazards throwing forward his left toward General Warren. This order, as I am informed by Captain Cadwallader, Aid-decamp, who accompanied the officer carrying it, was received at half-past 2 P. M. by General French, who protested against it as hazardous to his command, and desired Captain Cadwallader to assume the responsibility of suspending it. General French, in his report, herewith submitted, states that, after sending at twenty minutes past nine A. M. to General Prince, commanding his leading division, to ascertain his position, he (General French) became satisfied the head of the column had struck the Raccoon Ford road near the enemy's intrenched position on Mine Run, and that he then determined to throw his line forward, deploying to his left to connect with Warren, and that he communicated this fact to the commanding general. No such information was received by me, and it would appear by the reports of the division commanders of the Third corps, that no such movement was made by that corps till about half-past 2 P. M., or the time my order was delivered, as stated by Captain Cadwallader, A. D. C.

Brigadier--General Prince, commanding the leading division, reports that after advancing a short distance (about a mile) he came to a fork in the road where he halted to obtain information; that he ascertained that the right-hand fork was the most direct route to Robertson's Tavern, but but that it led into the Raccoon Ford, occupied [265] by the enemy; that the left-hand road led to Robertson's Tavern, and also in the direction of Warren's firing, which he plainly heard. For these reasons General Prince was satisfied he should take the left-hand road, and so reported to General French, and awaited orders. After a delay of two hours, he was finally ordered to take the other road, which.he did, his skirmishers soon encountering the enemy. He there reports he was ordered to cease operations, as he was on the wrong road; and after another delay, he was again ordered forward with the information that he was on the right road. Soon after advancing the second time, Carr's division being deployed on his left, the enemy opened a warm fire, and General Prince reports his line fell back a short distance, till they uncovered a battery he had posted in the only open ground that was in the rear. The line rallied and re-formed behind the battery, the fire from which checked the advancing enemy, when the line advanced to its former position and halted, the action ceasing, as it was then dark. General Carr, on the left of General Prince, had one of his brigades driven back, and his other brigades relieved by Birney's division after exhausting their ammunition. Birney's division, formed in rear of Carr's, soon relieved the latter, repulsing all the attacks of the enemy, and finally, toward dark, advancing its line of skirmishers over the battle-field.

I have been thus minute in the details of the movements of the Third corps, because in my opinion the unnecessary delay in the progress of this corps, and the failure to attack the enemy as soon as he was encountered, deploying to the left, and allowing the Sixth corps to pass, and continue the line to Warren, was the cause that a junction of the centre and right columns was not made early in the morning of the twenty-seventh, and was one of the primary causes of the failure of the whole movement. In consequence of this delay, Warren remained on the defensive all day, and toward evening, being pressed by the enemy, and I being anxious to hold Robertson's Tavern, the centre and key-point of my position, sent orders for the First corps to move over from the plank-road to the support of Warren, the corps arriving at Robertson's Tavern about dark of the twenty-seventh. The Fifth corps moved early in the morning after a slight delay to permit Gregg's division of cavalry to precede it on the plank-road. Gregg advanced as far as Hope Church, where he had a severe engagement with the enemy's cavalry, in which he was successful in driving them, until they were strongly reinforced by infantry, when Gregg fell back, and was relieved by Major-General Sykes, commanding the Fifth corps, who by this time had been advised of the failure of the Third corps to connect with the Second, and who was accordingly instructed not to advance beyond the crossing of the road from Robertson's Tavern, near which is Hope Church. From the reports of the force in front of Major-Generals, French and Warren, there was reason to believe the enemy were concentrating on the turnpike and Raccoon Ford roads, and orders were sent to the Fifth and Sixth corps to move over toward Robertson's Tavern, which order was executed by daylight the next morning, twenty-eighth ultimo. On this day (the twenty-eighth) disposition was made to attack the enemy, but on driving in his pickets it was found he had retired during the night. Pursuit was immediately made, the Second corps in advance, when, after a march of about two miles, the enemy was found in position on the west bank of Mine Run. A severe storm of rain had set in, delaying the marching of the troops, particularly the artillery, and preventing a. position being taken up till after dark, at which time, the Second, Sixth, First, and part of the Third corps were in line fronting the enemy. A reconnoissance of the enemy's position showed it to be extremely formidable. The western bank of Mine Run, with an elevation of over one hundred feet, had a gentle and smooth slope to the creek, averaging over a thousand yards of cleared ground. The summit, on which was the enemy's line of battle, was already crowned with infantry parapets, abattis, epaulements for batteries. The creek itself was a considerable obstacle, in many places swampy and impassable. A careful examination, made personally and by engineer officers, convinced me there was no probability of success in an attack in our immediate front in the vicinity of the turnpike. It was therefore determined, on the evening of the twenty-eighth, to send Major-General Warren, with the Second corps and a division of the Sixth corps, to move to our left, to feel for the enemy's right flank, and turn him, if practicable; at the same time orders were given to each corps commander to critically examine his front, and ascertain the practicability of an assault. The twenty-ninth was spent in the reconnoissance and the movement of General Warren. About six P. M. Brigadier-General Wright, commanding division in the Sixth corps, reported to me he had discovered a point, on our extreme right, where the obstacles to be overcome were much less than in our immediate front, and where an assault, he thought, was practicable with inconsiderable loss. At the same time Captain Michler, engineer, reported that an assault in front of the Third corps, though hazardous, was not impracticable. I also learned from Major Ludlow, A. D. C., just returned from General Warren's column, that General Warren had moved up the plank-road, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, till he developed their line of battle, and had taken a position which outflanked the enemy, and from which there was no difficulty of assaulting and turning the enemy's flank. These favorable reports caused me to decide on making three assaults--one on the enemy's left flank, with the Sixth and Fifth corps; one in the centre, with the Third and First corps; and one on the enemy's right, by the force under General Warren, consisting of the Second corps and one division of the Sixth. At eight P. M., General Warren reported in person, confirming all Major Ludlow had reported, [266] and expressing such confidence in his ability to carry every thing before him, as to induce him to give the opinion that he did not believe the enemy would remain over night, so completely did he command him.

The earnest confidence that General Warren expressed of his ability to carry every thing before him, and the reliance I placed on that officer's judgment, together with the fact that Major-General French had given an adverse opinion to assaulting in his front, induced me to modify my plan so far as to abandon the centre attack, and reenforce Warren's column with two divisions of the Third corps, which would give him six divisions — nearly half the infantry force under my command; orders were accordingly issued to that effect. The batteries of the centre and right were to open at eight o'clock, at which time Warren was to make the main attack, and at nine o'clock Sedgwick was to assault with his column; and when these attacks proved successful, the three divisions of the Third and First corps, left to hold the centre, would assault in conjunction with the others, after making demonstrations in their fronts at eight o'clock. The division of cavalry, commanded by Brigadier-General Gregg, held the plank-road in rear of the infantry, and repulsed several attempts of the enemy's cavalry to break through his lines, for the purpose of reaching our communications. The division of cavalry commanded by Brigadier-General Custer, charged with the duty of holding the upper fords of the Rapidan, was very active, and crossed the river and followed up the enemy wherever he fell back from his works. On the thirtieth, the batteries opened at eight o'clock am.; the skirmishers of the First and Third corps advanced across Mine Run, and drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and every preparation was made by Sedgwick for his attack, having moved his column during the night, and massed them out of view of the enemy. When about ten minutes before nine I received a despatch from General Warren to the effect “that the position and strength of the enemy seem so formidable in my present front, that I advise against making the attack here. The full light of the sun shows me I cannot succeed.” The staff-officer who brought this despatch further reported that General Warren had suspended his attack, and would not make it without further orders. As Sedgwick's attack was subsidiary to Warren's, and as owing to Warren's confidence of the night before, I had given him so large a part of the army, that I had not the means of supporting Sedgwick in case of a repulse, or reenforcing him in the event of success, I was obliged to suspend the attack of Sedgwick on the enemy's left, which I did just in time, and immediately proceeded to General Warren's column, some four miles distant, in the hope of arranging some plan by which the two attacks might yet take place in the afternoon.

I reached General Warren between nine and ten A. M., and found his views were unchangeable and that it was his decided opinion it was hopeless to make any attack. It was too late to move the troops back and make an attack on the centre that day, and General Warren was already so far separated from the right, that his movement to turn the enemy's right could not be continued without moving up the rest of the army in support, and abandoning the turnpike road, our main line of communications. Nothing further could be done this day, and at night the two divisions of the Third corps returned to the centre, and the Fifth and Sixth corps returned to their former positions. It was then reported to me that the opening of our batteries in the morning had exposed to the enemy our threatened attack on his left, and that he could be seen strengthening the position by earthwork, abattis, putting guns in position, etc., so that by night-fall the chances of success had been materially diminished; and knowing he would work all night, I felt satisfied that by morning the proposed point of attack, which had been weak, would be as strong as any other part of his line. Under these circumstances, I could see no other course to pursue than either to hazard an assault, which I knew to be hopeless, and which I believed would be attended with certain disaster, or acknowledging the whole movement a failure, withdraw the army to the south bank of the Rapidan. To have attempted any further flank movement would have required the abandoning the turnpike and plank-roads, and involved the necessity of bringing across the river and up to my lines the supply-trains of the army, which till now had remained at Richardsville. I was precluded from attempting this by the knowledge that a day's storm would prevent this train and the artillery from returning, and that in the event of disaster, I should have to abandon both. Besides, an inspection of the map will show that all the roads in this part of the country run nearly east and west, connecting Gordonsville and Orange Court-House with Fredericksburgh; whereas, in moving in around the enemy I should have to take a southerly direction, and would be obliged to make roads across the country, not only the work of time, but at this period of frosts, from the character of the soil, impracticable. In full view of the consequences, after mature deliberation, I determined to withdraw the army. But for the restrictions imposed upon me by the General-in-Chief, I should in retiring have taken up a position in front of Fredericksburgh, and I cannot but think that substantial advantages would have resulted from such a disposition of the army.

I am free to admit that the movement across the Rapidan was a failure; but I respectfully submit that the causes of this failure, a careful perusal of the foregoing report will show, were beyond my control. I maintain my plan was a feasible one. Had the columns made the progress I anticipated, and effected a junction on the night of the twenty-sixth, at and near Robertson's Tavern, the advance the next day would either have passed the formidable position of [267] Mine Run without opposition, or had Ewell attempted to check the movement, he would have been overwhelmed before reinforced by Hill. Prisoners reported that Hill did not come up till the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, so that if the movements of the Third corps had been prompt and vigorous on the twenty-seventh, assisted by the Sixth and Second, there was every reason to believe Ewell could have been overcome before the arrival of Hill. And after the enemy, through these culpable delays, had been permitted to concentrate on Mine Run, I have reason to believe, but for the unfortunate error of judgment of Major-General Warren, my original plan of attack in three columns would have been successful, or at least, under the view I took of it, would certainly have been tried. It may be said I should not depend upon the judgment of others; but it is impossible a commanding general can reconnoitre in person a line of over seven miles in extent, and act on his own judgment as to the expediency of attacking or not.

Again it may be said, that the effort should have been made to test the value of my judgment, or, in other words, I should encounter what I believed to be certain defeat so as to prove conclusively that victory was impossible. Considering how sacred is the trust of the lives of the brave men under my command, but, willing as I am to shed their blood, and my own where duty requires and my judgment dictates that the sacrifice will not be in vain, I cannot be a party to a wanton slaughter of my troops for any mere personal end.

The reports of the corps commanders, with those of such of the division commanders as accompany them, together with the list of the casualties, are all herewith submitted, except those from the cavalry, not yet received. I also send a sketch prepared by the engineer, showing the routes taken by each column. The point marked “Widow Morris” is where the roads fork, the left-hand fork being the one the Third corps should have taken. The point marked “Tom Morris” is the scene of the action of the twenty-seventh ultimo.

Very respectfully, etc.,

George G. Meade, Major-General Commanding.

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