ignorant of the cause, and, but for the prudence of my Aid-de-camp, Lieutenant McKim, might have fired into our own cavalry. We were then marching by the flank. It was arranged between General Stuart and myself that I should form line of battle and advance, and as soon as this was done, to inform him of the fact. He informed me that we were but a short half mile from Manassas. I estimated the distance afterward at one and a half to two miles, being disappointed, as we advanced, by his estimate. The distance can easily be known to any one by the fact that when I met General Stuart, he was opposite the centre of woods on the north of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, where the extensive hospitals had been erected. Therefore the pickets which he refers to were not the enemy's interior, but their exterior pickets. The encounter with these pickets was by musketry alone, and by a single discharge of artillery, as our troops were not over four hundred yards from the spot, and could easily distinguish the irregularity of the fire as that of the skirmishers, to which General Stuart does not allude in his report. I received no orders from General Stuart as to the disposition of my force in its advance, and it was not until we received the fire of the enemy's batteries a half mile distant from Manassas, that I disposed the regiments each on either side of the railroad. General Stuart is entirely mistaken in his statement that I soon sent him word it was so dark I preferred waiting till morning. I sent no such message, nor anything like it; and General Jackson can himself judge of the likelihood of my doing so by recalling to his mind the fact that I wrote him a note previous to our reaching Bristoe, suggesting a night attack with one brigade (not mine) as the only means of securing the immense stores which I had heard were there, and saving them from conflagration. The only message I sent to General Stuart was by my Aidde-camp, Lieutenant McKim, that I was ready to advance — should do so at once — and that he could assist, with his cavalry, in any way he judged proper. I saw no cavalry that night until two or two and a half hours after the capture had taken place, when a regiment arrived unmolested from the north side of the railroad, commanded by Colonel Flournoy, I think. The time of their arrival I can fix with tolerable precision, as my note to General Jackson was written at three A. M., [which please correct,] and I sought Colonel Flournoy, who had come in a short time before to obtain a courier to bear the note. As to the statement of General Stuart that “the place was taken without difficulty,” I am embarrassed by a difficulty in applying the compliment to myself or to him, but will generously give him the benefit of the doubt, and admit that it was taken without difficulty, so far as his executions contributed to its capture. The statements of officers hereto appended are sent, not to rectify anything I have stated in my report, but only to throw light on the position and operations of the cavalry. It is worth notice that Captain Shepperd states he met the cavalry, on his return for ambulances, almost one mile and a half in the rear of Manassas Station, (the railroad junction is three fourths of a mile from Manassas Station,) commonly called the Junction, probably on the exact spot where we left them, and that they asked him if we had captured Manassas. I beg that you will report that the capture took place about half past 12 A. M., the night of the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh August; and I further request that the foregoing explanations may be appended to my report, and accompany it as official. Having had access to my notes, I subjoin a list of part of the stores taken by the capture. schedule of part of public property captured at Manassas Junction. Fifty thousand pounds bacon. One thousand barrels corned beef. Two thousand barrels salt pork. Two thousand barrels flour. Two trains loaded with promiscuous stores, clothing, etc. Large stores of oats, and corn, and whiskey. Eight brass pieces light artillery, caissons, and ammunition. Seventy-two artillery horses and harness. One hundred and seventy-five horses, (draft.) Forty-two wagons and ambulances. Four sutlers' stores and contents. Two hundred to three hundred new tents. I have the honor to be, respectfully, Your obedient servant,
J. R. Trimble, Major-General.
Manassas, it was halted, when about a mile and a half from the Junction, in consequence of the report of a few musket shots in front, occasioned, as was soon ascertained, by the fire of the enemy's pickets upon our cavalry, under the command of Major-General Stuart. After a short interview with General Stuart, your command was formed in line of battle, and I was sent to notify General Stuart of your readiness to advance. I found him asleep under a tree. He was awakened by one of his staff, and I delivered your message. The firing which occasioned our halt was from the enemy's pickets alone. No gun was fired by the enemy until we were within half a mile of Manassas. I saw nothing more of the cavalry after delivering to General Stuart your message, and it has always been my impression that they did not participate in the attack upon Manassas. I remain, sir, Very respectfully yours,