management, withdrawn, without a scratch, after firing their allotted rounds. Nor was injury received from the enemy at a single one of our field guns. A good many shells flew over us, and seemed well aimed along the general course we had to take. But they passed beyond, or fell short; or when the ground turned us to the right or left, they deviated the other way. These occurrences, and the remarkable fact, that just when nearing the enemy, our batteries had to pass a rocky hill, likely to occasion great noise, the heaviest rain fell, and drowned the rattling of wheels, &c., made upon many the salutary impression that a kind Providence favored our enterprise. Forty-one, out of the forty-three guns enumerated, were brought into action. It being deemed imprudent to crowd more in the space, and the two heaviest, intended to act with Captain Dabney's long rifles, Captain Milledge having found it impracticable to get sufficiently early into position. The casualties we suffered were as follows: At one of Captain Dabney's large guns, by an exploding shell of the enemy, one man killed and two wounded, and three horses slightly injured. In Captain R. C. M. Page's battery, by their own carelessness, from their own fire, three men were wounded; and at one of Lieutenant Thurmond's guns, by its overturning in the road, two men wounded. In all, one killed and seven wounded. The amount of injury inflicted upon the enemy we could not accurately estimate. Though from the known range of our guns, the care taken in adjusting them, and the great number of objects at which to direct fire, less than serious damage could scarcely have resulted. Statements, apparently reliable, have also reached us, derived from the admissions of the enemy, that more than twenty of their vessels were considerably injured, and thirty or forty men and fifty horses killed. How near this is to the truth I cannot judge. Every officer behaved well, and nearly every man, and the entire enterprise was really a signal success. Rarely has difficulty been overcome on so large a scale, under so much risk, with so little to regret. This, while to be gratefully attributed to the favor of divine Providence, should also be credited to the exemplary conduct of the officers and men engaged. Colonel Brown, Lieutenant-Colonels Cutts and Coleman, and Major Nelson, who directed the operations of their respective commands, the company officers, who skilfully seconded their efforts, the medical and other members of my staff, and the men who, with persistent care and courage, did the work, are well entitled to praise for what was achieved. By dawn, August first, my whole command was far enough back to take a few hours' rest, well earned and much needed. When thus sufficiently refreshed to march again, we moved, in compliance with orders from yourself, to the neighborhood of Petersburg, where, awaiting another opportunity, we have since remained. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
W. N. Pendleton, Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery.
Report of Brigadier-General Hampton of operations in the recent advance of the enemy.
headquarters First brigade cavalry, August 10, 1862.Major: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the Major-General commanding, the following report of the operations of my brigade, on the recent advance of the enemy, together with the reports of the Colonels under my command: At half past 12 A. M., August fifth, Colonel Young notified me that he had received information of the presence of the enemy in front of Colonel Baker, and that they were apparently advancing. I sent this courier immediately to General Toombs, and despatched another to endeavor to procure accurate information as to the movements of the enemy. This latter returned before daylight, confirming fully the report of the first, and bringing the additional information from Colonel Baker that the enemy were in strong force of all arms. This courier was sent forthwith to give his report to General Toombs also, and I then ordered out the reserves of Cobb's legion, to proceed with them to the support of Colonel Baker; but as I was about to leave my quarters, having previously despatched a courier to Major-General Longstreet, conveying all the information in my possession, I heard the enemy open fire on the artillery and infantry stationed at Malvern Hill. I rode at once to the quarters of General Toombs, and communicated the intelligence to him, suggesting to him the propriety of reinforcing his troops on the hill. I told him that if he would take reenforcements to the hill, and would let me have some artillery, I would attack the enemy in the rear near Crew's house. This was agreed on; and proceeding with the Cobb legion and Moody's artillery, I gained the position from which General Magruder had attacked the enemy on the first July ultimo. On reaching this point, I found the enemy on the same ground occupied by him in the battle of the first of last month, whilst the troops which had been stationed on Malvern Hill were retreating. Fearing for my rear guard, and having only three pieces of artillery, with two small squadrons of cavalry, I withdrew to our main lines. During that day I held the enemy in strict observance, but had no opportunity to strike at him. Our picket lines were established, and well maintained. On the seventh, I was ordered by General Lee to reconnoitre on the right flank of the enemy with my command. This was done as the infantry advanced in front. I proceeded through Gatewood farm to Carter's mill. The enemy had retreated, and a few stragglers were fallen in with. My personal observation was confined to the right and centre of my line, as I was unable to leave these positions during the two days operations. I must, therefore, refer you to the report of Colonel McGruder for information as to the occurrences on the left, where he was stationed. I can confirm the reports of Colonels Baker and Young
Major Fitzhugh, A. A. G.:
Major Fitzhugh, A. A. G.: