which subordinates the comfort and pleasure of the individual to the greatest good of the greatest number.
The trouble was that upon the organization of so many regiments of volunteer cavalry, both officers and men were naturally uninstructed and therefore inefficient.
Horses were overloaded, marches were prolonged beyond endurance and without proper halts for rest, forage was not always regularly provided, and troopers were not held down to those many little things which, whether in the saddle or in camp, make for the endurance of the horse and for the mobility of mounted troops.
Tactically, both officers and men of the newly made cavalry had everything to learn.
In spite of the splendid natural material which was attracted to the mounted service, and the lavish expenditures of the Federal Government
in its behalf, the first period of the war only emphasized the fact that, given unlimited resources in the way of men, horses, and equipment, efficient cavalry cannot be developed inside of two years or more.
To be fully prepared at the outbreak of war, regular cavalry should be kept during peace at its war strength; while if reserves of militia cavalry cannot be conveniently maintained during peace, ample reserve supplies of arms and equipment should be laid by, and such encouragement given to the breeding and rearing of saddle-horses as will enable the Government
to place cavalry in the field without all the vexatious and humiliating delays which attended the fitting out of the Federal
cavalry force in 1861 and 1862.