the direction of the chief of construction and transportation rendered great aid in the transportation of troops and in the removal of the wounded from the front.
The supply of the army was kept up at the same time.
This would have been entirely impossible in the early days of the war, yet the necessity of having one head for this service had not yet impressed itself on all the general officers
's army, for we find interference with the operation of trains from officers who would not have done so if they had realized the importance of non-interference.
There has been some controversy regarding the non-arrival of troops at the front during this campaign, and the point has been made that it was impossible to secure rail transportation.
It appears that the railroad was a single-track one, with a limited equipment of cars and engines, and necessarily it was impossible to forward troops with the rapidity that could have been desired, but under the circumstances the operation of the trains was as successful as could have been hoped for.
In consequence of the interference by subordinates with the running of trains, a positive order was issued by General Halleck
to all concerned, directing that no military officer should give any orders, except through the chief of the construction corps, that would affect the operation of the road, and that all orders must come from either General Pope
or General Halleck
, except in case of attack on the road, in which case the officials of the road were to consult the commander of the nearest body of troops.
By August 26th, it was evident that the railroad could be relied on for nothing more than the necessary supplies for Pope
's army, except in cases where the trains should happen to be unemployed, in which case troops could be forwarded.
A schedule for use in such event was provided.
Transportation was to be furnished in the following order: First, subsistence for men in the field; second, forage; third, ammunition; fourth, hospital stores; fifth, infantry regiments that had seen