attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time.
I never heard that such was even contemplated.
Again, he continues: “General Longstreet
's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell
, General Johnson
had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him;” and then goes on to relate the causes of his failure, one of them being because the projected attack on the enemy's left had not been made, thus enabling him to occupy his right with a largely superior force; and again, he says (I quote exactly): “General Longstreet
was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced; his operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood
He was therefore reinforced by Heth
's division and two brigades of Pender
's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble
If General Longstreet
did not attack early on the 3d, as General Lee
says he was ordered to do, his reasons for not doing so appear to have been perfectly satisfactory to General Lee
; and as the same causes were in existence when Pickett
's charge was made, it is not to be disputed that General Lee
could not have expected Longstreet
's two right divisions to take part in that charge.
In his account of what is known as Pickett
's charge, General Lee
says — and as General Lee
's report was published before his death, and was uncontradicted, or was not disputed, I take it for granted that what he there says, in regard to his own orders and his own intentions, etc., cannot now be questioned:
The troops moved steadily on under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery against the enemy's left centre, whose batteries reopened as soon as they appeared.
Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply or render the necessary support to the attacking party.
Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering from the concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill on the left.
It was about this stage in the charge that I saw the advance.
It is intimated here by General Lee
that if he had known that our artillery ammunition was so exhausted as to be unable to reply at the critical moment, that the charge would not have been made.