maps of the battlefield show, the entire Seventeenth corps was forced from its works and position of the morning, and took up a new line at right angles to its original line of battle; and here in this new position, with compressed lines, strengthed by junction with the Sixteenth corps, and otherwise reinforced and protected by the tight rifle-pit, which he says his troops had barely time to throw up, they were again vigorously attacked, and the battle was pressed so fiercely, and so late in the night, and the opposing lines were so close, that “it was impossible for a person looking on to tell one line from the other, except from the direction of the fire from the muzzles of the guns.” If Hardee's troops failed to accomplish more, it was because it was not within the compass of human energy and endurance. As it was, they held the battlefield, to which the enemy were admitted under flag-of-truce next day to bury their dead, and counted among their captures thirteen stands of colors, a number of guns, including several entire batteries, in some instances with horses and equipments complete, arms, &c., and about two thousand prisoners. Meanwhile Wheeler, in co-operation with Hardee's operations, attacked the detached easterly forces of the enemy with results described by him as follows:
Most of my troops were dismounted — those on my right remaining on horseback. The fight was very spirited. My troops struck the extreme left; or rather, I should say, the most eastwardly troops of Sherman's army. My right encountered strong entrenchments; while my left, more fortunate, met the enemy without that protection. The resistance was very determined, but finally one point was carried, and the entire line was swept before our charge, leaving prisoners, cannon, colors, wagons and much other material in our hands.Afterwards, in obedience to instructions from General Hardee, he closed in towards Hardee's right, and was there warmly engaged until dark. With consistent injustice General Hood compliments Wheeler (of whom it may justly be said no praise could be beyond his deserts) for attacking the detached force near Decatur, by way of disparaging Hardee for not (in contravention of the real plan of operations) marching to or beyond Decatur, ignoring the fact that the whole was a concerted movement in which Wheeler was co-operating with Hardee and subject to his orders.