The failure of General Hooker to cut Jackson's column when moving to his rear at Chancellorsville has been much discussed. The following letter will throw some light on an interesting episode of that great movement: numbers of guns (I think there were but two), the nature of the position, the casualties, and any other facts that may be of interest, which I should like to incorporate in the history of my company soon to be published. Hoping to hear something authentic touching this matter in your next issue, I am, sir, Yours, very truly,John D. Billings, Historian, and former member of Tenth Massachusetts Battery, Second Army corps, Army of Potomac.
Captain Moore, of the Fourteenth Tennessee, which I think you would have mentioned, had you known, or not forgotten it. When the ordnance train of Hill's division was approaching Catherine Furnace (where the road turns abruptly to the left and down hill) the confusion ahead carried me forward, where I found bullets whistling through the wagons. Passing the crest of the hill and riding up to some cavalry, formed some fifty yards off and partially sheltered, I asked the commander (Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, of the Fourth Virginia, if my memory is correct) “why he did not protect the wagons.” He told me that the infantry had run out, and that he could do nothing with the force at his command. I told him that there was artillery in the train just back of my ordnance, and that I would run my wagons through the fire, if he would stop the artillery and check the enemy's advance. This was done, two guns placed in position, two shots fired and the men driven from the guns by the minnies of the enemy. At this moment Captain Stanard, A. P. Hill's ordnance officer, rode towards me, calling me, and told me that some infantry refused to “go in” for him, but said that they would accept orders from me. I