Another report of General Rosecrans shows that General McPherson with his fresh troops, reached him just before sunset after the battle, and together with the whole command began the pursuit at daylight the next morning. Rosecrans' force in the battle of Corinth was fifteen thousand seven hundred infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry, an aggregate of eighteen thousand two hundred against an enemy of thirty-eight thousand. General Sherman admits that ‘beyond doubt the rebel army lost at Corinth fully six thousand men.’ The records set forth with sufficient clearness the brilliant character of the battle, the energy of the pursuit, and the satisfaction felt by General Grant at the results. So far as the differences which arose between Generals Grant and Rosecrans about this time, grew out of these movements, they appear to have had their origin chiefly in General Rosecrans' insisting upon pursuing the enemy beyond where General Grant considered it prudent to do so, and persisting in expressing his opinions against those of his commanding officer. But whatever the causes of difference were, General Grant's report, setting forth that an earlier pursuit than the one made was probably impracticable, is a full answer to General Sherman's version of the cause of trouble.
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Cincinnati: Wilstach, Baldwin & Co. 1875.
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