us, and confined himself to the more cautious policy of a system of gradual approaches and mining.
His force was not less than sixty thousand men. Thus affairs continued until July 1st, when General Pemberton
thus describes the causes which made capitulation necessary:
It must be remembered that, for forty-seven days and nights, those heroic men had been exposed to burning suns, drenching rains, damp fogs, and heavy dews, and that during all this period they never had, by day or by night, the slightest relief.
The extent of our works required every available man in the trenches, and even then they were in many places insufficiently manned.
It was not in my power to relieve any portion of the line for a single hour.
Confined to the narrow limits of trench, with their limbs cramped and swollen, without exercise, constantly exposed to a murderous storm of shot and shell. . . . Is it strange that the men grew weak and attenuated?. . . They had held the place against an enemy five times their number, admirably clothed and fed, and abundantly supplied with all the appliances of war. Whenever the foe attempted an assault, they drove him back discomfited, covering the ground with his killed and wounded, and already had they torn from his grasp five stands of colors as trophies of their prowess, none of which were allowed to fall again into his hands.
Under these circumstances, he says, he became satisfied that the time had arrived when it was necessary either to evacuate the city by cutting his way out or to capitulate.
Inquiries were made of the division commanders respecting the ability of the troops to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful sortie and force their way through the enemy; all of them reported their several commands quite unequal to the performance of such an effort.
Therefore, it was resolved to seek terms of capitulation.
These were obtained, and the city was surrendered on July 4th.
The report of General Pemberton
contains this statement:
Knowing the anxious desire of the Government to relieve Vicksburg, I felt assured that, if within the compass of its power, the siege would be raised; but, when forty-seven days and nights had passed, with the knowledge I then possessed that no adequate relief was to be expected, I felt that I ought not longer to place in jeopardy the brave men whose lives had been intrusted to my care.
Hence, after the suggestion of the alternative of cutting my way out, I determined to make terms, not because my men were starved out, not because I could not hold out yet a little longer, but because they were overpowered by numbers, worn down with fatigue, and each day saw our defenses crumbling beneath their feet. . . . With an unlimited supply of provisions, the garrison could, for reasons already given, have held out much longer.
At the close of General Pemberton
's report he notices two officers, whose gallant services have been repeatedly mentioned in the foregoing pages, as follows: