This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
 General Huger's line of march was farther to the right, therefore nearer to White-Oak Swamp, and the impediments were consequently greater than where General Rodes found the route so difficult as to be dangerous even to infantry. On the next day, June 1st, General Longstreet states that a serious attack was made on our position, and that it was repulsed. This refers to the works which Hill's division had captured the day before, and which the enemy endeavored to retake. From the final report of General Longstreet, already cited, it appears that he was ordered to attack on the morning of the 31st, and he explains why it was postponed for six hours; then he states that it was commenced by the division of General D. H. Hill, which drove the enemy steadily back, pressing forward until nightfall. The movement of Rodes's brigade on the right flank is credited with having contributed much to the dislodgment of the enemy from their abatis and first entrenchments. As just stated, General Longstreet reports a delay of some six hours in making this attack, because he was waiting for General Huger, and then made it successfully with Hill's division and some brigades from his own. These questions must naturally arise in the mind of the reader: Why did not our troops on the left, during this long delay, as well as during the period occupied by Hill's assault, cooperate in the attack? And why, the battle having been preconceived, were they so far removed as not to hear the first guns? The officers of the Federal army, when called before a committee appointed by their Congress to inquire into the conduct of the war, have by their testimony made it quite plain that the divided condition of their troops and the length of time required for their concentration after the battle commenced, rendered it practicable for our forces, if united—as, taking the initiative, they well might have been—to have crushed or put to flight first Keyes's and then Heintzelman's corps before Sumner crossed the Chickahominy, between five and six o'clock in the evening. By the official reports our aggregate loss was, ‘killed, wounded, and missing,’ 6,084, of which 4,851 were in Longstreet's command on the right, and 1,233 in Smith's command on the left. The enemy reported its aggregate loss at 5,739. It may have been less than ours, for we stormed its successive defenses. Our success upon the right was proved by our possession of the enemy's works, as well as by the capture of ten pieces of artillery, four flags, a large amount of camp equipage, and more than one thousand prisoners. Our aggregate of both wings was about 40,500. The force of the
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.