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‘Colonel: If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our effort pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Pickett to make the charge.
I shall rely a great deal upon your judgment to determine the matter and shall expect you to let Gen. Pickett know when the moment offers.’
Until that moment, though I fully recognized the strength of the enemy's position, I had not doubted that we would carry it, in my confidence that
Lee was ordering it. But here was a proposition that
I should decide the question.
Overwhelming reasons against the assault at once seemed to stare me in the face.
Gen. Wright of
Anderson's division was standing with me. I showed him the letter and expressed my views.
He advised me to write them to
Longstreet, which I did as follows:—
‘General: I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire on the enemy by his return fire, as his infantry is little exposed to view and the smoke will obscure the field.
If, as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one, and if result is unfavorable we will have none left for another effort.
And even if this is entirely successful, it can only be so at a very bloody cost.’
To this note,
Longstreet soon replied as follows: —
‘Colonel: The intention is to advance the infantry if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy's off, or having other effect such as to warrant us in making the attack.
When that moment arrives advise Gen. Pickett and of course advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack.’
Evidently the cannonade was to be allowed to begin.
Then the responsibility would be upon me to decide whether or not
Pickett should charge.
If not, we must return to Va. to replenish ammunition, and the campaign would be a failure.
I knew that our guns could not drive off the enemy, but I had a vague hope that with
Ewell's and
Hill's cooperation something might happen, though I knew little either of their positions, their opportunities, or their orders.
I asked
Wright: ‘What do you think of it?
Is it as hard to get there as it looks?’
He answered: ‘The trouble is not in ’
