various points without making any serious impression.
These brigades constituted the whole command of Polk
in charge of the right wing, except the division of Cheatham
which contained five brigades.
Why neither Bragg
put them in until after 6 P. M. is not explained.
One would imagine that they would have been called upon before giving up the whole plan of the battle, which was now done.
Originally, it had been designed to break the left flank of the enemy and then sweep him to the right.
Now the effort will be to break the right flank and sweep to the left.
And in this the right wing of the army will take no more part than the left wing has taken in the battle of the morning, and Cheatham
's division will practically take none at all.
About 11 A. M., Bragg
, finding the attack on the enemy's left making no progress, sent a staff-officer down the lines with orders to every division commander to move upon the enemy immediately.
The order was first delivered to Stewart
's division of Buckner
This formed two lines deep and two brigades front, with the aid of Wood
's brigade of Cleburne
's division on its right.
The four brigades, Brown
followed by Clayton
, advanced together.
The enemy were driven by this charge some 200 yards and lost a battery of guns, but here the impulse was gone and the advance stopped.
had appealed to Bragg
for permission to attack with his entire wing, and, consent being given, had formed Johnson
's division with Fulton
in front, with Gregg
in the second line, and with Hood
's division in a third line.
's division formed on the left, and about 11.30 a general advance was essayed.
's division was in reserve on the extreme left.
It is now time to look in the Federal
ranks and see what was taking place there.
Although the attack was only made at 9.30, and by only 12 brigades, and was resisted by Thomas
with 12 brigades in fortified lines, yet, at 10.10 A. M., we find Garfield
's adjutant, writing to McCook
to be prepared to support the left flank, ‘at all hazards even if the right is drawn wholly to the present left.’
At 10.30 he called for help, and Sheridan
's division was ordered to him. At 10.45, upon a