acted as rear-guard from Spring Hill
, was ordered to remain far enough in front of the line to compel Hood
to disclose his intention to attack in front or to turn the position, and was to retire and take its position in reserve at the proper time, if the enemy formed for attack.
Only one of those three brigades—Opdycke's—came in at the proper time and took its appropriate place; and that, it was asserted, no doubt truly, was by the brigade commander's own volition, he having been soldier enough to know his duty in such a case, without the necessity for any orders.
The other two brigades remained in their advanced position until they were run over by the enemy.
Much idle controversy was indulged in among officers of the Fourth Corps and others in respect to the action of those two brigades.
The only proper way to settle such a question was by a court-martial.
As the corps passed from my command the next morning, and had been under my orders only a few days, I have never made any effort to fix, even in my own mind, the responsibility for that blunder.
By great exertion on the part of the engineers, the means of crossing the river were at length provided.
The supports of the burned wagon-bridge were still standing at a level with the surface of the water.
They were timbered and planked over, and the railroad bridge was also covered with planking, thus giving us two passable bridges.
The trains had all been crossed over, and a part of the artillery.
Orders had been issued for the troops to begin crossing at dark, when Hood
disclosed his purpose to attack.
The artillery was ordered back to its position in the line, and General Stanley
and I, who were then together on the north side of the river, rode rapidly to our posts, he to his corps on the south side, and I to the high redoubt on the north bank, overlooking the entire field.
There I witnessed the grandest display possible in war.