are essentially erroneous.
must have been fully aware of our relative weakness in numbers at Franklin
, and of the probable, if not certain, concentration of large reinforcements at Nashville
He could not hope to have at any future time anything like so great an advantage in that respect.
The army at Franklin
and the troops at Nashville
were within one night's march of each other; Hood
must therefore attack on November 30, or lose the advantage of greatly superior numbers.
It was impossible, after the pursuit from Spring Hill
, in a short day to turn our position or make any other attack but a direct one in front.
Besides, our position, with the river in our rear, gave him the chance of vastly greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth
Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault at Franklin
The defenses were of the slightest character, and it was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th absolutely necessary.
The Confederate cause had reached a condition closely verging on desperation, and Hood
's commander-in-chief had called upon him to undertake operations which he thought appropriate to such an emergency.
was the last opportunity he could expect to have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement.
He must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost.
I believe, therefore, that there can be no room for doubt that Hood
's assault was entirely justifiable.
It may have been faulty in execution, in not having been sufficiently supported by a powerful reserve at the moment of first success.
I have not the means of knowing the actual facts in this regard; but the result seems to render such a hypothesis at least probable, and the