's attack and inflicted such heavy losses upon his troops.
himself impliedly made this suggestion when he expressed the opinion that Thomas
ought to have turned on Hood
after his repulse at Franklin
; and General Jacob D. Cox
, who had been in the thickest of the fight all the time, with high soldierly instinct sent me, by one of my staff officers, the suggestion that we stay there and finish the fight the next day. A fight to a finish, then and there, might quite probably have given us the prize.
But the reasons for declining that tempting opportunity for complete victory will, I believe, seem perfectly clear when fully stated.
In anticipation of orders from General Thomas
to fall back to Nashville
that night, the trains had been ordered to the rear before the battle began, so as to clear the way for the march of our troops, and to render impossible any interference by the enemy's cavalry.
Our ammunition had been well-nigh exhausted in the battle at Franklin
, as is shown by my telegram to General Thomas
to send a million rounds to Brentwood
, thinking he might want me to hold Hood
there until he could get A. J. Smith
's troops in position and supplied with ammunition.
If I had needed any such warning, that given me by the general in his despatch,1
‘But you must look out that the enemy does not still persist,’ would have been sufficient to deter me from fighting him the next day with my ‘back to the river.’
Besides, it is not easy to estimate at midnight exactly the results of a desperate battle then just terminated.
But all this is insignificant when compared with the controlling reason.
I had then fully accomplished the object (and I could not then know how much more) for which the command in the field had for a time been intrusted to me. My junction with reinforcements at Nashville
was assured, as also the future