of his march through Georgia
and that through the Carolinas, the former was only a change of base preparatory to the latter, the great final campaign of the war, which had for its end the defeat and capture of Lee
and his army expected to share the glory of capturing Richmond
's army, which had baffled the Eastern
troops for four years. This feeling in the army was very general and very manifest at the time.
After the concentration at Goldsboroa, Sherman
's plan was to march straight for Lee
's rear at Petersburg
, and he expected Johnston
to keep ahead of him and to unite with Lee
for the final struggle at or near Richmond
's idea was quite different: he wanted Sherman
to keep between Lee
and prevent their union, as well as to cut off Lee
's retreat if he should escape before Grant
was ready to move, the latter alleging that he had ample force to take care of Lee
as soon as the necessary preparations were made and the roads would permit him to move.
It was this important difference of plan that occasioned Sherman
's visit to City Point
, where he hoped to gain Grant
's acquiescence in his own plans.
The result was the movement ordered by Sherman
on his return to Goldsboroa, which was substantially the same as that which Grant
had before proposed.
's immediate army proved to be, as he predicted it would, amply sufficient for the capture of the whole of Lee
Hence it is difficult to see in what respect Sherman
's campaign of the Carolinas
was essential to that great result, or proved to be more important than his march through Georgia
Each was a great raid, inflicting immense damage upon the enemy's country and resources, demoralizing to the people at home and the army in Virginia
, cutting off supplies necessary to the support of the latter, possibly expediting somewhat the final crisis at Richmond
, and certainly