felt ‘outraged beyond measure,’ was natural and indeed inevitable.
He had committed an error of judgment arising from political inexperience and a failure to appreciate the difference between Mr. Lincoln
's humane purposes toward individual Confederates and his political policy.
But the error was of the least possible practical consequence, and there was not the slightest excuse for making it public at the time, in violation of all rules of official courtesy.
All that it was necessary or right to do was to tell Sherman
to correct his error.
While the effect of these ferocious bulletins received some time later was such as General Sherman
fully describes, the first effect of the simple disapproval of the convention, both upon Sherman
, not referred to by either in their published narratives, may be interesting to the readers of history.
was manifestly much disappointed and mortified at the rejection of his terms, although he had been prepared somewhat by expressions of opinion from others in the interval, and both he and Johnston
at their last meeting seemed sad and dejected.
To understand this, it must be remembered that Johnston
's army was not surrounded, and its surrender could not have been compelled.
Unless the terms of capitulation could be made such as the troops themselves would be willing to accept, they would, it was apprehended, break up into guerrilla bands of greater or less strength and carry on the war in that way indefinitely.
So strongly was I impressed at the time with General Johnston
's apprehension, that I was often thereafter haunted in my dreams with the difficulties I was actually encountering in the prosecution of military operations against those remnants of the Confederate armies, in marshy and mountainous countries, through summer heats and winter storms.
It was several years after the war that