not appear to have had the wisdom and moral courage to advocate such a policy.
Both were impatient to see their party represented on the floors of Congress by members from the South
It was something of the kind above suggested which was aimed at by Generals Sherman
, and which was deemed wise by the leading generals both North and South.
There were several conditions in the memorandum that were clearly inadmissible, though easy of correction without changing the essential features of the document.
This was to be expected from a hasty effort to solve a great political problem by a man without political education or experience.
's failure was not unlike that of great politicians who undertake to command armies.
Their general ideas may be very good, but they have no knowledge of details, and hence make mistakes resulting in failure.
As now seen, projected upon the dark background of the political history of the Southern States
during the twelve years from 1865 to 1877, and compared with the plans of political doctrinaires in 1865, under the light of experience and reason, the Sherman-Johnston
memorandum and Sherman
's letters of that period seem self-luminous with political wisdom.
needed only the aid of competent military advisers in whom he had confidence to have made him one of the greatest generals of any age, and he would have needed only the aid of competent political advisers to have made him a great statesman.
But he looked almost with contempt upon a ‘staff,’ and would doubtless have thought little better of a ‘cabinet.’
The efforts of political leaders to establish an absolutely impossible popular government in the South
seem to show the necessity of general political education, no less than the military blunders of the war show the necessity of general military education.
If our schools would drop