passed out of sight, and then were found ‘feeding’ again on their old ground.
I felt greatly complimented when Halleck
, on his return from Corinth
to St. Louis
, en route to Washington
to take command of the army, gave me a full explanation of his ‘siege of Corinth
,’ including his application of the standard European
tactics of a former generation, with its rule of 10,000 men to the mile in line and regular approaches.
I was many years younger than Halleck
, and the other chief commanders
, and hence had much more to learn than they.
Perhaps I was also, on account of comparative youth, more teachable.
At any rate, the two lessons from Halleck
above referred to, and later experience, caused me to do ‘a world of thinking’; so that I was amazed beyond expression when, in the winter of 1863-64, just before Grant
was made lieutenant-general, Halleck
told me that his
plan for the next campaign was to send west of the Mississippi River
force enough to finish the war in all that region of country, and then return and clear up the States east of that river!
I said nothing, but could not help thinking that it was, sure enough, time to have another general-in-chief of the army.
But accepting his strategic theory of operations in the American Civil War
,—territorial conquest,—his plans of campaign were unquestionably sound.
was, I believe, a man of great ability and of high military education, though with little practical experience in war; yet his peculiar views, and still more singular action, have seemed to me very remarkable.
He remained in Washington
, practically inert, while one of the great armies of which he was general-in-chief was suffering sore reverses, almost in sight of the Capitol
, and the country's cause greatly imperiled for want of a competent commander for that army.
How could a soldier