the execution of the order devolved on subordinate officers, and the troops were so dispersed as to be unable to act with the necessary effect.
It having become apparent that the services of troops would probably be required in the city of Chicago
, and in anticipation of orders from the President
, instructions were telegraphed on July 2 to the commanding general
of the Department of the Missouri to make preparations to move the garrison of Fort Sheridan to the Lake Front Park
in the city.
The reply of his staff-officer, Colonel Martin
, showed that the department commander, Major-General Miles
, was not in Chicago
, and the adjutant-general
of the army did not know where he was, but, after several inquiries by telegraph, learned that the general had started that afternoon from Long Island
instead of for Chicago
The next day (July 3), in the President
's room at the Executive Mansion
, in reply to my suggestion that his presence was needed with his command, General Miles
said he was subject to orders, but that in his opinion the United States troops ought not to be employed in the city of Chicago
at that time.
No reply was made by the President
or the Secretary of War
, who was also present, to that expression of opinion, but the President
approved my further suggestion that General Miles
should return at once to his command.
The general started by the first train, but could not reach Chicago
in time to meet the emergency.
It became necessary in the judgment of the President
to order the Fort Sheridan
garrison into the city in the afternoon of the same day (July 3).
The instructions given the day before about moving the troops to Lake Front Park were not complied with.
From that point they could most readily have protected the sub-treasury, custom-house, post-office, and other United States
property, and also have acted in a formidable body at any other point where their services