forth the relative functions of the army and the navy in enforcing the military policy of the United States
The military problem which this country must solve is to provide such means of aggressive and defensive action as to be able to enforce a due observance of American public law on this continent, and, while doing this, to defend itself against insult and spoliation.
The land defenses, including torpedoes and in a few cases floating batteries, should be entirely independent of the active navy, so that the latter may be free to act in one compact mass against any enemy which may anywhere oppose it.
There will be another important necessity for very large forces of infantry and light artillery,—that is, large in the aggregate,—in the event of war with even a second-or third-class naval power: to protect our long lines of open coast and small unfortified harbors from destruction by the guns and landing-parties of the enemy's light-draft cruisers.
This would require a ‘picket-line’ with considerable ‘reserves,’ several thousand miles in length.
The national pride, if not the material interests involved, would not permit the government to submit to such destruction or spoliation without making every possible effort to prevent it. In short, unless the government and the people of the United States
are willing to prepare in advance for putting into the field at a moment's notice a very large and effective army, as well as to fortify all important seaports, they may as well make up their minds to submit, at least for a time, to whatever indignity any considerable naval power may see fit to inflict upon them.
No half-way measures will do any good.
Fortifications without an army would be worth no more, against any country having a considerable army and navy, than an army without fortifications.