of two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps on our left, north of Dalton
Had these divisions been attacked, as Sherman
apprehended, they might have suffered severely, but would have drawn off force enough from the enemy to increase largely the probabilities of success in the attack in Johnston
One half of Sherman
's infantry was ample for the demonstration in front of Dalton
At least one half should have been sent through Snake Creek Gap to strike the enemy's rear.
There was no necessity to attack Resaca
at all, and experience has shown what terrible losses a small force in a strongly fortified position may inflict upon a very large attacking force.
Two or three brigades could have invested Resaca
, with the garrison it then held, while a force large enough to hold its ground against Johnston
's whole army could have been put upon the railroad between Resaca
The result would then, in all probability, have been what Sherman
Indeed, the fate of Johnston
's army might perhaps have been decided then and there.
certainly cannot be suspected of wishing to do injustice to the memory of McPherson
, for he loved and respected him most highly, and mourned his death with evident sincerity.
But I think he is in error in saying that ‘at the critical moment McPherson
seems to have been a little timid.’
I believe the error was Sherman
's, not McPherson
's; that McPherson
was correct in his judgment, which certainly was mine (after passing over the same ground and fighting the battle of Resaca
), that his force was entirely too small for the work assigned it. I had not the same opportunity General Sherman
had of judging of McPherson
's qualities as a commander; but I knew him well and intimately, having sat upon the same bench with him at West Point
for four years, and been his room-mate for a year and a half.
His was the most completely balanced mind and character with which