held by the 14th Kentucky at the opening of the engagement, and not only did I offer to show General Sherman
that the dead of my ‘advance division were lying farther out than any of Hooker
's,’ but he actually rode with me over the ground, and saw the dead of the 14th Kentucky lying in advance of Hooker
My impression is that Hooker
, in his signal-despatch of 5:30 P. M., saying, ‘We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our only apprehension being for our extreme right flank.
Three entire corps are in front of us,’1
meant by ‘our extreme right flank’ not his own right, but mine—that is, the extreme
right of the entire line; for at the time of that despatch nearly my whole corps was strongly posted on Hooker
's right, and was well ‘refused,’ forming a strong right flank.
This General Hooker
But the Sandtown Road
leading to our rear, on which Cox
's division had been posted until Johnston
's attack made it necessary to close him up on Hascall
, was now less strongly guarded.
I believe that General Hooker
had conceived the idea, as indicated by his despatch to Sherman
, that Johnston
had drawn his main force from around Kenesaw
, and was about to strike our extreme right.
I recollect that I was all the time on the watch for such a blow, but relied upon my cavalry to give me some warning of it, and made it a rule to be always as well prepared for it as I could.
Being habitually on the flank, I had got used to that sort of thing, while Hooker
, having been habitually in the center with his flanks well protected, was more nervous about having them exposed.
At all events, I did not regard the situation at the Kolb House
as anything unusual, and did not think of mentioning it in such a light to General Sherman
; while General Hooker
, with a sort of paternal feeling of seniority, may have thought it his duty to take care of the whole right wing of the