despatch at the time, I should have interpreted it then, as I do now, as referring, not to his immediate right, but to the extreme right of the line.
I do not recollect any words, ‘pretty sharp’ or otherwise, between General Hooker
and myself on that subject, and do not believe it was ever mentioned between us. In short, I do not think I was present at the interview in the ‘little church’ described by General Sherman
's ‘Memoirs,’ Vol.
II, page 59). I have an impression that General Hascall
was there, and that it is to him General Sherman
I believe the Kolb House
difficulty was almost entirely a misapprehension between General Sherman
and General Hooker
Why this mistake was not explained at the time or afterward I do not know, unless it was that the feelings of those two gentlemen toward each other were unfavorable to any such explanation.
I will add that General Hooker
and I were together both before and after the opening of the Kolb House
He knew perfectly well where my troops were, and what they were doing, and it seems to me utterly impossible that he can have meant by his despatch what General Sherman
understood it to mean.
My despatches of that date to Sherman
show that I had no special apprehension even in respect to our extreme right flank, and that I doubted the report that one whole corps was in our front.
My orders on that day1
show that Hascall
was up with Hooker
at the intersection of the Marietta
and Powder Spring roads, near the Kolb House
, as early as 3 P. M., and that Cox
was ordered up with three brigades at 4:15 P. M., before the assault began
arrived with the head of his column during the enemy's attack, and was directed by me in person where and how to put his troops in position.
Hence I think I must be right in the inference that in Hooker
's despatch to Sherman
of 5:30 P. M., the