words ‘our extreme right flank’ must have been intended to refer to my
extreme right, and not his
. He was simply unduly apprehensive for the safety of the extreme right flank of the army, not of his own corps in particular.
My report to General Sherman
at 9 P. M. simply shows that I did not share that apprehension; that, instead of believing there were ‘three entire corps in front of us,’ I doubted whether there was even all of Hood
's habit of swinging off from the rest of General Thomas
's army, and getting possession of roads designated for McPherson
or for me, was a common subject of remark between Sherman
, and myself; and his motive was understood to be, as General Sherman
states, to get command of one of the armies, in the event of battle, by virtue of his senior commission.
But the subject was never mentioned between General Hooker
and me, and he never even approximated to giving me an order.
No doubt he entertained the opinion that he would have a right to give orders to either General McPherson
or myself under certain circumstances likely to arise, for General Sherman
entertained the same opinion.
What General Thomas
thought on the question I never knew.
My own opinion and McPherson
's were decidedly the contrary.
In the final movement which resulted in the withdrawal of Johnston
's army from Kenesaw
, the Army of the Tennessee passed by the right flank of my infantry line along the famous Sandtown Road. While this was going on, McPherson
and I sat on our horses together a long time, observing the movement and renewing the familiar intercourse of our youth.
We had a long and free conversation on a great variety of subjects—a rare opportunity for commanders, even in the same army, where their troops were generally from ten to twenty miles apart in line of battle.
One of the first subjects