was not to sever its connection with the main body, and hence might not reach far enough to strike an exposed flank of the enemy.
But even with this modification I thought the movement ought to have a fair chance of success.
That movement was not suggested by me in ally way, and, so far as I know, not by General Thomas
I believe it originated entirely with General Sherman
I never heard of it until I received his orders.
There was no ‘argument’ by me of the question of relative rank, as suggested by General Sherman
II, page 99).
The positions of the troops when the order for the movement was made rendered it convenient that the Twenty-third Corps be put in first,—that is, next to the right of General Thomas
's troops then in position,— while the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General John M. Palmer
, was relied upon to develop rapidly to our right and endeavor to strike the enemy's flank before he could extend his intrenched line far enough to meet and resist our attack.
It was not until some time after my orders for this movement had been issued and should have been in process of vigorous execution that I received the first intimation that the question of rank had been raised, as stated by General Sherman
, and that my orders had simply been transmitted to the division commanders of the Fourteenth Corps.
It cannot for a moment be admitted that any share of the blame for that failure attaches to the Fourteenth Corps, as such.
Nor do I believe with General Sherman
that its slowness on that occasion was due to anything ‘imbibed’ from General Thomas
My own view of military duty was different from that entertained by the commander of the Fourteenth Corps, as was shown in my subsequent action, hereinafter referred to, when I was ordered to report to and act under the orders of General Stanley
But if the distinguished statesman who then commanded the Fourteenth Corps