fell into error at that time, he has doubtless since regretted it far more than any other man could possibly do; and he has many times atoned for that error by the great services to the country which he has continued to render up to the present time.
The primary and principal cause of this and all similar difficulties during the Atlanta campaign
was the grave error of opinion which disregarded the special rank of army and department commanders given them by the President
's assignment under the law, and the still graver error of judgment in leaving such an important question open until the eve of battle, in the ‘hope that there would be no necessity for making this decision.’
This error seems incomprehensible when it is considered that it in effect nullified the President
's selection of army and department commanders at the most important of all moments, the crisis of battle, by making these commanders subject to the orders of any general of older commission whose troops happened to be adjacent to theirs.
In the midst of battle, when the orders of a common superior cannot be obtained in time to meet an emergency, the highest commander present must give the necessary orders and must be obeyed.
This is probably the gravest responsibility of war. Yet Sherman
's opinion and decision would have placed this responsibility, not upon the army commander who had been selected by the President
, upon the advice of the general-in-chief
, under an act of Congress passed especially for the purpose, but upon some one who through political influence or otherwise had got an earlier commission of major-general.
So many of the latter had proved to be unqualified for responsible command that Congress had enacted a special law authorizing the President
to supersede such prior commissions and assign commanders of armies or army corps in the field and in any department