- The final blow at Atlanta -- Johnston's untried plan of resistance -- Hood's faulty move -- holding the Pivot of the position -- Anecdotes of the men in the ranks -- Deferring to General Stanley in a question of relative rank -- the failure at Jonesboroa -- the capture of Atlanta -- absent from the army -- Hood's operations in Sherman's rear -- sent back to Thomas's aid -- faulty instructions to oppose Hood at Pulaski -- at Columbia -- reason of the delay in Exchanging Messages.
when all our efforts to accomplish decisive results by partial operations upon the flanks had failed, this question was much discussed: What more decisive movement shall next be made for the capture of Atlanta? There were practically but two propositions to be considered: that of General Sherman, which was adopted with success; and that heretofore referred to as having never been tried, to detach two or more corps to make a lodgment on the railroad at or below East Point, and thus compel the enemy to come out of Atlanta and endeavor to regain control of his only line of supply, or abandon that city altogether. General Sherman thought it too hazardous to detach two corps, though he was willing for me to undertake it with one. In fact, this feeling marked General Sherman's action throughout the campaign. He had no hesitation in detaching a small force, the loss of which would still leave him greatly superior in numbers to the enemy, or a very large force under his own command,