quite unlike that of musketry, which could not be mistaken for anything but the explosion of shells.
There could be no room for doubt that these lights and sounds meant the destruction in Atlanta
of magazines or carloads of fixed ammunition, and hence that Hood
was abandoning that place.
I reported my observations and conclusion to General Sherman
, but he ‘still remained in doubt.’
The doubt was to me incomprehensible; but perhaps that was because I had no doubt from the start, whether I was right or wrong, what the result would be. My period of elation was when we got firm hold of the railroad at Rough and Ready.
having failed to attack our exposed flank during the movement, the fall of Atlanta
was already an accomplished fact with me when Sherman
was still in doubt, as well as when Thomas
thought the news ‘too good to be true.’
But the above is worthy of noting only as a necessary introduction to something far more important.
's army was now divided and scattered over a distance of thirty miles, one corps below Jonesboroa
being just driven from its ground with considerable loss and in retreat to Lovejoy
's, the main body leaving Atlanta
and stretched along the road toward McDonough
; while Sherman
's whole army, except Slocum
's corps, was in compact order about Jonesboroa
, nearly in a straight line between Atlanta
's. This seemed exactly the opportunity to destroy Hood
's army, if that was the objective of the campaign.
So anxious was I that this be attempted that I offered to go with two corps, or even with one, and intercept Hood
's retreat on the McDonough
road, and hold him until Sherman
could dispose of Hardee
or interpose his army between him and Hood
But more prudent counsels prevailed, and we remained quietly in our camps for five days, while Hood
leisurely marched round us with all his baggage and Georgia
militia, and collected his scattered fragments at Lovejoy