brigades, was soon disposed of; and I then returned to Nashville
, and went at once by rail to Pulaski
, arriving at that place in the evening of November 13.
Some so-called histories of the Tennessee
campaign have been based upon the theory that I was marching from Georgia
, to unite my corps with General Thomas
's army at Nashville
, when I encountered Hood
, and after a sharp contest managed to elude him and continue my march and unite with the Army of the Cumberland at Nashville
Hence I wish to point out clearly that I had been with the entire Twenty-third Corps to Nashville
, with a part of it to Johnsonville
and back to Nashville
, and thence to Columbia
and near Pulaski
, all by rail; that all of the Army of the Cumberland then in Tennessee
was the Fourth Corps and the cavalry at and near Pulaski
; that General Thomas
placed those troops under my command, and that they remained so until after the battle of Franklin
, November 30, and the retreat to Nashville
that night; and that General Thomas
did not have an army at Nashville
until December 1.
I had united with Thomas
's troops two weeks before the battle of Franklin
, and was commanding his army in the field as well as my own during that time.
If the historians had read the records1
they could not possibly have fallen into such a mistake.
Before reaching Pulaski
I was furnished with an order from General Thomas
's headquarters assigning me to the command in the field, by virtue of my rank as a department commander, and a copy of instructions which had already been telegraphed to General Stanley
I assumed command in the morning of November 14.
The moment I met Stanley
, in the evening of November 13, he called my attention to the faulty position of the troops and to an error in General Thomas
's instructions, about which I then knew nothing because I