, Oct. 9, 1839; graduated at the
Naval Academy in 1860; was with the West Gulf blockading squadron in 1861; took part in the engagements which led to the surrender of
, in 1863; was promoted lieutenant-commander in 1866, and commander in 1874.
He was placed in command of the
.
He was promoted captain in 1888, and in 1891, when a number of American sailors were stoned by a mob in
(q. v.) to
began was given command of the newly organized Flying Squadron for service off the coasts of the
were at first independent of each other, but co-operated in searching for the Spanish squadron under
.
of the naval force, was absent on a run to Siboney.
He was promoted rear-admiral in August, 1898; and was appointed commander-in-chief of the
Atlantic Station.
He was retired on reaching the age limit, Oct. 9, 1901.
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, July 6, 1898.
The
Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Squadron:
Sir,—First.
I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the squadron under your command which came under my observation during the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898.
Second.
At 9.35 A. M.
Admiral Cervera, with the
Infanta Maria Teresa,
the Vizcaya, the
Oquendo, the
Cristobal Colon, and two torpedo-boat destroyers came out of the harbor of
Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and attempted to escape to the westward.
Signal was made from the
Iowa that the enemy was coming out, but his movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment.
This vessel was the farthest west, except the
Vixen, of the blockading line; signal was made to the western division, as prescribed in your general orders, and there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and varying to 3,000 until the
Vizcaya was destroyed, about 10.50 A. M. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.
Third.
About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began two vessels, thought to be the
Maria Teresa and the
Oquendo, and since verified as. such, took fire from the effective shelling of the squadron and were forced to run on the beach, some 6 or 7 miles west of the harbor entrance, where they burned and blew up later.
The torpedo-boat destroyers were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs.
This, doubtless,. was better seen from your flag-ship.
Fourth.
the
Vizcaya and the
Colon, perceiving the disaster to their consorts, continued at full speed to the westward to escape, and were followed and engaged in a running fight with the
Brooklyn, the
Texas, the
Iowa, and the
Oregon, until 10.50 o'clock, when the
Vizcaya took fire from our shells.
She put her helm to port, and with a heavy list to port side inshore and ran aground at Acerraderos, about 20 miles west of
Santiago, on fire fore and aft, and where she blew up during the night.
Observing that she had struck her colors, and that several vessels were nearing her to capture and save her crew,. signal was made to cease firing.
the
Oregon proving vastly faster than the other battle-ships, she and the
Brooklyn, together with the
Texas and another vessel, which proved to be your flag-ship, continued westward in pursuit of the
Colon.
which had run close inshore,
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evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her pursuers.
Fifth.
The pursuit continued with increasing speed in the
Brooklyn, the
Oregon, and other ships, and soon the
Brooklyn and the
Oregon were within long range of the
Colon, when the
Oregon opened fire with her 13-inch guns, landing a shell close to the
Colon.
A moment afterwards the
Brooklyn opened fire with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the
Colon, now in range of the
Brooklyn and the
Oregon's guns.
Her commander, seeing all chances of escape cut off and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck her flag, at 1.15 P. M., and ran ashore at a point some 50 miles west of Santiago Harbor.
Your flag-ship was coming up rapidly at the time, as were also the
Texas and the
Vixen.
A little later, after your arrival, the
Cristobal Colon, which had struck to the
Brooklyn and the
Oregon, was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your command.
Sixth.
During my official visit a little later
Commander Eaton, of the
Resolute, appeared and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battle-ship near Altares.
Your orders to me were to take the
Oregon and go eastward to meet her, and this was done by the
Brooklyn, with the result that the vessel reported as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser
Infanta Maria Theresa, seeking the commander-inchief.
Seventh.
I would mention for your consideration that the
Brooklyn occupied the most westward blockading position, with the
Vixen, and, being more directly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes—possibly ten— to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range.
I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you for such action as you may deem proper the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision and skilful handling of their respective vessels of
Captain Philip,
Captain Evans,
Captain Clark, and especially of my chief of staff,
Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal observation, and whose coolness, promptness, and courage were of the highest order.
The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the
Indiana and the
Gloucester, but as these vessels were closer to your flag-ship no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation.
Eighth.
Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the
Vixen, acted with conspicuous courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his light guns, nevertheless he was close into the battle line under heavy fire, and many of the enemy's shot passed beyond his vessel.
Ninth.
I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag lieutenant,
James H. Sears, and
Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr.,
aide, who were constantly at my side during the engagement, and who exposed themselves fearlessly in discharging their duties; and also to the splendid behavior of my secretary,
Lieut. B. W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the fourth division with splendid effect.
Tenth.
I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the engagement of
Lieut-Com. N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory.
Eleventh.
The navigator,
Lieut. A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers,
Lieut. T. D. Griffin,
Lieut. W. P. Rush,
Lieut. Edward Simpson,
Lieut. J. G. Doyle, and
Ensign Charles Webster, and the junior divisional officers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty, contributing to the accurate firing of this ship in their part of the great victory of your forces.
Twelfth.
The officers of the medical, pay, and engineer and marine corps responded to every demand of the occasion, and were fearless in exposing themselves.
The warrant officers,
Boatswain William L. Hill,
Carpenter G. H. Warford, and
Gunner F. T. Applegate, were everywhere
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exposed in watching for damage, reports of which were promptly conveyed to me.
Thirteenth.
I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier crew than that of the
Brooklyn.
During the combat, lasting from 9.30 A. M. until 1.15 P. M., much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern, and over the ship.
Fourteenth.
The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the capture of the admiral and some 1,300 to 1,500 prisoners, with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by
Admiral Cervera at 600 men.
Fifteenth.
The casualties on board this ship were:
G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed;
J. Burns, fireman, first-class, severely wounded.
The marks and scars show that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898.
The speed-cone halyards were shot away, and nearly all the signal halyards.
The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down at the close of the action it fell in pieces.
Sixteenth.
I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory of the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.
Seventeenth.
I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the
commanding officer and a drawing in profile of the ship showing the location of hits and scars; also a memorandum of the ammunition expended and the amount to fill her allowance.
Eighteenth.
Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the captains—viz.,
Captain Eulate, of the
Vizcaya, and the second in command of the
Colon,
Commander Controras—I have learned that the
Spanish admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for a while on the
Brooklyn, and the
Vizcaya to ram her, in hopes, if they could destroy her, the chance of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of your squadron.
This explains the heavy fire mentioned in the
Vizcaya's action in the earlier moments of the engagement.
The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistible, furious, and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.
Nineteenth.
I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the waterline was due to a water valve being opened from some unknown cause and flooding the compartment.
The injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the leak small.
Twentieth.
I beg to enclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the combat of July 3, 1898.
Twenty-first.
I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the splendid conduct and support of
Capt. C. E. Clark, of the
Oregon.
Her speed was wonderful, and her accurate fire splendidly destructive.
, noted in the sketch of the former, led to criticisms on the conduct of the latter during the
fight, which were considered by his friends exceedingly unjust.
Personally he took no notice of the reflections upon his professional conduct, declaring that the history had been made, and the proofs of it were in the public documents, until July 22, 1901, when he requested a court of inquiry into his conduct.
on Sept. 12, and on Dec. 13, 1901, reported its proceedings and the testimony taken, with a full and detailed statement of all the pertinent facts, which it deems to be established, together with its opinion and recommendation in the premises.
The text of the opinion and the recommendation are as follows:
Opinion of Court
Commodore Schley, in command of the
Flying Squadron, should have proceeded with utmost despatch off
Cienfuegos and should have maintained a close blockade of that port.
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He should have endeavored on May 23, at
Cienfuegos, to obtain information regarding the Spanish squadron by communicating with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him at 8.15 A. M. of that date.
He should have proceeded from
Cienfuegos to
Santiago de Cuba with all despatch, and should have disposed his vessels with a view of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the
Flying Squadron.
He should not have delayed the squadron for the
Eagle.
He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his squadron.
He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Department's order of May 25.
He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago Harbor on May 29 and 30.
He did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the
Colon and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31.
By commencing the engagement on July 3 with the port battery and turning the
Brooklyn around with port helm,
Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the
Vizcaya and
Colon.
The turn of the
Brooklyn to starboard was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels.
The turn was made towards the
Texas and caused that vessel to stop and to back her engines to avoid possible collision.
Admiral Schley did injustice to
Lieut.-Com. A. C. Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed between them.
Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the
Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise.
His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the
Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading.
His conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-possessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinates, officers and men, to fight courageously.
