August 1st, establishes the almost incredible fact that the head of one of the most important of our departments did not know the state of its affairs.
This was but additional evidence of improvidence and mismanagement.
There was this difference, however, between Colonel Myers
and Colonel Northrop
; the former was ever ready to correct an error when in his power to do so, the latter would not allow his errors to be pointed out, and, still less, discussed.
In Colonel Myers
's letter to General Beauregard
, above referred to, he writes: ‘I never, until day before yesterday, have heard one word of this deficiency; then, the knowledge came to me through a despatch from General J. E. Johnston
, to the Adjutant-General
I took immediate steps to collect, at Manassas
, as much transportation as I suppose you will require. . . . The military operations and manoeuvres of your army are never divulged, and it is utterly impossible for me to know how to anticipate your wants. . . . We have had, so far, too many heads, which I can say to you, and which means, we have had no head at all
. You should write me often, if only a line, when anything is required, and you shall be provided if possible.’
The only conclusion to be drawn from this is, that General Beauregard
's demands and requisitions made to the War Department were totally disregarded, and never reached the office of the Quartermaster-General
We now give General Beauregard
's answer to Colonel Myers