shall be carefully and impartially examined, with the declared object not to argue, but simply to demonstrate.
I. It must be borne in mind that General Johnston
arrived at Manassas
on the 20th of July, at noon; that is to say, only half a day, and one night, before the battle of the 21st.
He would certainly have arrived too late, had not the result of the action of Bull Run
, on the 18th, deterred General McDowell
from sooner making his contemplated attack.
And it must also be borne in mind that General Johnston
marched to the assistance of General Beauregard
, not of his own free will, or to prepare for a battle he had already planned, but in compliance with a tardy telegram from Richmond
, issued at the urgent request of General Beauregard
, who, from the early part of June until that day, had never ceased to counsel concentration and an aggressive campaign.
Such a junction had at last become an imperative necessity.
was forced to acknowledge it. Left free to use his discretion as to the ‘practicability’ of the ‘movement,’ he lost no time in putting his troops in motion.
Now, what did General Johnston
do upon reaching General Beauregard
's headquarters at Camp Pickens?
Upon assuming command, did he immediately instruct General Beauregard
as to what should be done in view of the coming conflict?
Did he draw up a plan of operations?
Did he issue orders for the distribution and location of the forces already at Manassas
, and of those that had just arrived, or might come in afterwards?
Not at all. In his own words we have it (Johnston
's ‘Narrative of Military Operations,’ p. 39) ‘that the position occupied by the Confederate army was too extensive, and the ground, much of it, too broken, thickly wooded, and intricate, to be studied to any purpose in the brief space of time at my disposal;
for I had come impressed with the opinion that it was necessary to attack the enemy next morning, to decide the event before the arrival of General Patterson
And here we might properly remark, that General Patterson
never arrived, nor has it been shown that he ever intended to do so. Long before writing his book, General Johnston
, in his official report, had said: ‘I found General Beauregard
's position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded and intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore determined to rely on his knowledge of it and of the enemy's positions.
This I did readily, from full confidence in his