between the two generals, how can it be supposed, first, that General Beauregard
would have asserted it, and, next, that General Johnston
would have allowed the assertion to pass uncontradicted, when we consider that the language used in General Beauregard
's report would have virtually deprived General Johnston
of his rightful claim to the command of our united forces.
We quote again from General Johnston
's ‘Narrative of Military Operations,’ pp. 40, 41: ‘General Beauregard
pointed out, on his map, five roads converging to Centreville
from different points of his front, and proposed an order of march on these roads, by which the army should be concentrated near the Federal
It was accepted without hesitation; and, having had no opportunity to sleep in either of the three nights immediately preceding, I requested him to draw up this order of march, and have the number of copies necessary written by our staff officers and brought to me for distribution that evening, while I was preparing, by rest, for the impending battle.’
The order of march—that is, the plan of battle—is proposed by General Beauregard
; ‘accepted without hesitation,’ by General Johnston
, and ‘drawn up’ by the former, while the latter is ‘preparing, by rest, for the impending battle.’
sleeps quietly, undisturbed by any direct responsibility for what is to ensue in the morning.
He comes to assist General Beauregard
, not to interfere with his plans.
This fight is not his own, but General Beauregard
's, and he so expresses himself in declining to direct the operations against the enemy.
And while he thus tranquilly takes his rest, General Beauregard
, who has no leisure to do the same, and has hardly had any sleep at all since the 17th, the day preceding the engagement of Bull Run
, goes on with the active preparations needed at the hour; issues and distributes the order of march and other orders; locates troops—his own and General Johnston
's—as if reinforcements alone had been sent him, unaccompanied by an officer of superior rank.
We admit, say those critics to whom this chapter is specially addressed, that the idea of concentration was General Beauregard
's; that the first plan of battle was his, likewise; but it was not carried out; the enemy's movements rendered it unavailing, and another plan was substituted in its stead.
, the superior in rank, being then on the field, who suggested it?
Our answer is, that a modification of the original plan had to