the enemy, than it does in connection with the modified plan of General Beauregard
. ‘Fortunately’ for General McDowell
's army, not ‘fortunately’ for ours, the miscarriage occurred.
Referring, in his report, to the movements of the enemy in the early morning of the 21st, and the non-arrival of the expected troops (some five thousand of his own) General Johnston
says: ‘General Beauregard
afterwards proposed’ (Beauregard
always proposing, Johnston
always accepting) ‘a modification of the abandoned plan—to attack with our right, while the left stood on the defensive.
This, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued, different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on our side.’
On the other hand, his ‘Narrative of Military Operations,’ pp. 47, 48, has the following passage: ‘It was now evident that a battle was to be fought, entirely different, in place and circumstances, from either of the two plans previously adopted. . . . Instead of taking the initiative and operating in front of our line, we were now compelled to fight on the defensive, a mile and a half behind that line, and at right angles to it, on a new and unsurveyed field, with no other plans than those suggested by the changing events of battle.’
The conclusion we are to draw from this is, that, as first agreed, we were to fight according to plans prepared and proposed by General Beauregard
and accepted by General Johnston
; and that now—strange as the assertion may appear—we are about to fight according to no plan at all. We submit that the fact—if fact it were—of our fighting ‘with no other plans than those suggested by the changing events of battle,’ does not show, in the least, that General Johnston
, either at that moment, or before or afterwards, ever assumed the responsibility of planning or directing the operations of the day.
We thus dwell upon General Johnston
's assertions, made in his report and in his book, because we take it that no better evidence than his own can be adduced in matters where he is so directly concerned.
More conclusive still does such evidence become, when corroborated, explained—though at times corrected—by passages of General Beauregard
's report on the same subject-matter.
Before quoting again from General Johnston
's work, let us briefly review the situation, as defined by its author.
We are now fighting with no preconcerted plan whatever.
We know nothing of the ground we stand upon.
This, however, clearly applies to