that General McDowell
had been ordered to advance, and would do so that very night.
He forwarded this news to Richmond
, and, undaunted by his former fruitless attempts, urged the absolute necessity of ordering Generals Johnston
to join their forces to his.
Then it was—but only then—that President Davis
consented to the long-suggested, long-prayed — for concentration, so repeatedly and vainly demanded.
An order—not an imperative one, however—was sent to General Johnston
, to move on to General Beauregard
's assistance, ‘if practicable.’
It was dated July 17th, and has already been transcribed in these pages.
Too late, thought General Beauregard
, and he so expressed himself in his telegram to General Cooper
, advising him that ‘the enemy will attack in force’ the next morning.
And the enemy did. The engagement of Bull Run
was fought and won; and General McDowell
, frustrated in this his attempt to carry our lines, fortunately for us, delayed his onward movement towards Richmond
Our success was announced to the War Department; what answer came back?
The despatch has already been given, but it is necessary to lay it again before the reader.
Even at this critical juncture, when no further doubt could exist of the enemy's intention to rush upon our lines in overwhelming force—the inevitable result of our defeat being the capture of Richmond
, so far from having projected concentrating our forces at Manassas
, was desirous of countermanding his order to General Johnston
, on the 19th of July, and so caused General Beauregard
to be advised.
No more need be said to show that the concentration of our forces at Manassas
was due to the energy and untiring efforts of General Beauregard
alone, and in nowise to any prevision or plan of President Davis
, who agreed to the proposed movement