“  pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with a certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our position.” General Grant telegraphed the same day as follows: “The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points east. . . . The number of men at Corinth, and within supporting distance of it, cannot be far from eighty thousand men. Some skirmishing took place between our outguards and the enemy's yesterday and the day before. . . . I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared, should such a thing take place. . . . It is my present intention to send them (Buell's three foremost divisions) to Hamburg, some four miles above Pittsburg, when they all get here.” . . . They [the Federal divisions at Pittsburg Landing] were widely separated, and did not sustain such relations to each other that it was possible to form quickly a connected defensive line. . . . They had no defences and no designated line for defence in the event of a sudden attack, and there was no general on the field to take, by special authority, the command of the whole force in an emergency. While the national army was unprepared for battle and unexpectant of such an event, and was passing the night of the 5th in fancied security, Johnston's army of forty thousand men was in close proximity, and ready for the bloody revelation of its presence and purpose on the following morning. . . . Early on the morning of the 6th of April, a Sabbath day of unusual brightness, cannonading in the direction of Pittsburg Landing was distinctly heard at Savannah. General Grant supposed that it indicated an attack upon his most advanced positions, and, not waiting to meet General Buell, as he had appointed, and not leaving any instructions or suggestions for his guidance in moving his army to the field, or even expressing a desire that he should give him support, he gave an order to General Nelson to march his division up to Pittsburg Landing, and, taking a steamer, hastened towards the noise of battle. He did, however, advise General Buell, by note, that an attack had been made, whose occurrence he had not anticipated before Monday or Tuesday; apologized for not meeting him, as he had contemplated, and mentioned the fact that he had ordered General Nelson to move with his division “to opposite Pittsburg Landing.” The omission to request him to take any other divisions to the field, or even to hasten their march to Savannah, must be accepted as conclusive that General Grant did not at the time anticipate such a battle as would require the assistance of other portions of the Army of the Ohio. . . . He [General Buell] subsequently received a note from General Grant, addressed to the commanding officer, advanced forces, near Pittsburg, Tennessee, advising him that his forces had been engaged since early morning, contending against an army estimated at a hundred thousand men, and that the introduction of fresh troops upon the field would inspire his men and dishearten the enemy.General Sherman's vain effort to show that he was ready for the Confederate attack on the morning of the 6th contradicts his
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