journals, touching the amount of property and stores destroyed by us at Corinth, and General Pope's alleged pressing pursuit.
Major-General Halleck's despatch of June 4th may particularly be characterized as disgracefully untrue.
Possibly, however, he was duped by his subordinate.
Nothing, for example, can be wider from the truth than that ten thousand men and fifteen thousand small arms of this army were captured or lost in addition to those destroyed at Booneville.
Some five hundred inferior small arms were accidentally left by convalescents in a camp four miles south of Corinth.
No artillery of any description was lost, no clothing, no tents worth removal were left standing.
In fine, the letters of newspaper correspondents, enclosed, give a correct statement both as to the conduct of the retreat, the scanty spoils of war left behind, the actual barrenness of substantial results to the enemy, and exhibit his doubt, perplexity, and ignorance concerning the movements of this army.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
I feel authorized to say, by the evacuation the plan of campaign of the enemy was utterly foiled, his delay of seven weeks and vast expenditures were of little value, and he has reached Corinth to find it a barren locality, which he must abandon as wholly worthless for his purposes.
We now refer the reader to the following extract from the letter of a correspondent to a Northern newspaper—the Chicago Tribune
—written at Pittsburg Landing
, May 30th, 1862, wherein are correctly described some of the most important events relative to the evacuation of Corinth
. . . The retreat of the enemy was conducted in the best of order.
Before our men had entered the place all had got off safely.
General Halleck has thus achieved one of the most barren triumphs of the war. In fact, it is tantamount to a defeat.
It gives the enemy an opportunity to select a new position as formidable as that at Corinth, and in which it will be far more difficult for us to attack him, on account of the distance our army will have to transport its supplies.
Supposing the enemy take up their second position of defense at Grand Junction, about sixty miles from here, four thousand additional wagons will be required. . . . Then there is the fatigue of our men, the attacks of guerilla parties in our rear, etc. I look upon the evacuation there as a victory for Beauregard, or, at least, as one of the most masterly pieces of strategy that has been displayed during this war. It prolongs the contest in the Southwest for at least six months. . . . Up to last night the enemy kept up a display of force along his whole line, thus completely deceiving our generals. . . .
General Halleck must feel deeply mortified at the evacuation.
It clearly shows that he knew nothing of the position and strength of the enemy and of his ulterior designs.