Appendices to Vol. I.
Appendix to Chapter I
Engineer Department, Washington, Jan. 24th, 1861.Major,—The Secretary of War directs that Special Orders No. 238, of Nov. 8th, 1860, appointing you to the post of Superintendent of the Military Academy, be revoked, and that you return to your former station at New Orleans. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Bvt. Major P. G. T. Beauregard, Corps of Engineers, West Point, N. Y.:
Jos. G. Totten, Bvt. Brig.-Genl., Chief Eng.
War Department, Adjutant. General's office, Washington, Jan. 25th, 1861.Special Order No. 19. Special Order No. 238, Adjutant-General's Office, of November, 1860, appointing Bvt. Major Peter G. T. Beauregard, Captain Corps of Engineers, to be the Superintendent of the Military Academy, is hereby revoked, and Major Beauregard will return to his former station at New Orleans, La. By order of the Secretary of War.
State army-but my professional knowledge, experience, and services, without military rank, are at the command of the State, even unto death. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
State must rely in the hour of danger.  I cannot presume to intrude my advice and opinions upon you again, and will only repeat that your decision will be a source of great regret and disappointment to the whole country, as well as to your friends, among whom, my dear sir, I hope you will permit me to include myself. With high respect, your obedient servant,
New Orleans, Feb. 13th, 1861.Gentlemen,—As time presses, and it may soon become urgent to be prepared for the worst, permit me to make a few suggestions which may lead to our successful preparation. In the first place, we must look to our most vulnerable point, the Mississippi River; for one single steamer, with only two or three guns, coming into the port of New Orleans, would in a few hours destroy millions' worth of property, or lay the city under a forced contribution of millions of dollars. It is an undeniable fact that, in the present condition of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, any steamer can pass them in broad daylight; and that even when in a proper condition for defence, they could not prevent the passage of one or more steamers during a dark or stormy night, without the assistance of a properly constructed raft or strong wire rope across the river between the two forts, so as to arrest the course of said steamers, even only for half an hour, under the severe cross-fire of said forts. The first thing to be done, then, is to commence the construction of (or prepare at least the materials for) said obstacles; then the guns of the land fronts of Fort Jackson ought to be mounted at once on the river fronts; the guns, chassis, and carriages at Baton Rouge, Forts Pike, Wood, Battery Bienvenu, etc., where they are not required at present, ought to be sent at once to these two forts on the river, to be put in position as advantageously as possible on their river fronts—not overlooking, however, the flank guns of the other fronts; all said chassis and carriages ought to be tried forthwith by double charges of powder and shot; ample supplies of ammunition ought to be sent there forthwith. The trees along the river, masking the fires of those two forts, up and down the river, ought to be cut down at once, particularly those on the Fort Jackson side. In a few words, no expenses ought to be spared to put those two works in a most efficient state of defence; for $50,000 or $100,000 spent thus, might, a few weeks hence, save millions of dollars to the State and city of New Orleans. A rough calculation shows me that the raft spoken of would cost about $40,000, and three wire cables probably $60,000. I prefer the first. Mr. John Roy, my former assistant architect on the New Orleans custom-house, would be of great assistance in the construction of either of said obstacles. In haste, I remain, gentlemen, very respectfully, your obedient servant. State of Louisiana, New Orleans, La.
423] relative to the condition of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, was received two days since. For the information I thank you, also for the valuable suggestions offered. I have written the members of the Board on the subject, and urged their immediate attention to the whole matter. I am aware of its importance, but am compelled to leave all such matters (military) to those who have a knowledge of them. I only regret, with all of our friends, that you could not accept the post tendered you, Colonel of Artillery and Chief of Engineers. With the highest regards, your obedient servant, In haste.
New Orleans, Feb. 19th, 1861.Dear Sir,—Your favor of the 17th instant has just been received. I thank you for regretting that I could not accept the military position tendered me. Although not in service, I wish it distinctly understood that my professional knowledge and experience are at the command of my native State, even unto death, whenever required—but without military rank; not, however, through any jealousy of General Bragg's appointment, for I am happy to state that it is a most excellent choice; and I should have been very happy to serve with him or under his orders, in the defence of our rights and firesides, if I could have accepted the Colonel and Chief of Engineers and Artillery position tendered me. I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Excellency, Gov. T. O. Moore, Baton Rouge, La.
Telegram of L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, to Governor Pickens, of South Carolina.Adjutant-General's office, Washington, Feb. 23d, 1861.Sir—Your resignation has been accepted by the President of the United States, to take effect the 20th instant. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
President received. This government assumes control of military operations at Charleston, and will make demand of the fort when fully advised. An officer goes to-night to take charge.L. P. Walker, Sec. of War.
President, has been referred by him to this department. In controlling the military operations  in the harbor of Charleston, the President directs me to say that everything will be done that may be due to the honor and rights of South Carolina. The President shares the feeling expressed by you, that Fort Sumter should be in our possession at the earliest moment possible. But this feeling, natural and just as it is admitted to be, must yield to the necessity of the case. Thorough preparation must be made before an attack is attempted, for the first blow must be successful, both for its moral and physical consequences, or otherwise the result might be disastrous to your State in the loss of many of those whom we can least afford to spare. A failure would demoralize our people, and injuriously affect us in the opinion of the world, as reckless and precipitate . . . Under the fourth section of an Act of Congress to raise Provisional Forces for the