Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865

[469] one hundred and forty, and averaged nine hundred and sixty-four each; from an order of the enemy's commander, however, dated July 13th, we learn that one hundred men from each regiment were directed to remain in charge of their respective camps; some allowance must further be made for the sick and details, which would reduce the average to eight hundred men; adding the Regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery present, an estimate of their force may be made.

A paper appended, marked ‘L,’ exhibits, in part, the ordnance and supplies captured, including some 28 field-pieces, of the best character of arm, with over 100 rounds of ammunition for each gun, 37 caissons, 6 forges, 4 battery-wagons, 64 artillery-horses, completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 4500 sets of accoutrements, over 500 muskets, some 9 regimental and garrison flags, with a number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a large store of axes and intrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence besides.

Added to these results, may rightly be noticed here, that by this battle an invading army, superbly equipped, within twenty miles of their base of operations, has been converted into one virtually besieged, and exclusively occupied for months in the construction of a stupendous series of fortifications, for the defence of its own capital.

I beg to call attention to the reports of the several subordinate commanders, for reference to the signal parts played by individuals of their respective commands. Contradictory statements, found in these reports, should not excite surprise, when we remember how difficult, if not impossible, it is to reconcile the narrations of by-standers or participants in even the most inconsiderable affair, much less the shifting, thrilling scenes of a battle-field.

Accompanying are maps, showing the positions of the armies on the morning of 21st July, and of three several stages of the battle, also of the line of Bull Run, north of Blackburn's Ford. These maps, from actual surveys made by Captain D. B. Harris, assisted by Mr. John Grant, were drawn by the latter with an accuracy worthy of high commendation.

In the conclusion of this report it is proper, and, doubtless, expected, that I should acquaint my countrymen with some of the sufficient causes that prevented the advance of our forces, and prolonged, vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. The War Department has been fully advised, long since, of all those causes, some of which only are proper to be here communicated. An army which had fought as ours that day, against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water, and without food, except a hastily snatched meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle. On the following day an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance, with reasonable prospects of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Comdg.