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proper mode of protecting the
Tennessee River against any attempted passage of the enemy's gunboats.
1
The day following he addressed a letter to
General Hood, advising him to regulate, by specific orders, the system of scouting then in practice by the commands of
Generals Wheeler,
Roddy, and
Forrest, in rear of the front line of the army, and suggested that cavalry scouts should be furnished with all necessary supplies, thus preventing the depredations on private property much complained of at the time, and so ruinous to discipline and order.
2 These instructions, and others verbally given, appeared to produce an unfortunate effect upon
General Hood, who began to chafe under the supervision exercised over him by
General Beauregard, and to fear his superior influence with the army.
That supervision would have been much greater and more direct had
General Beauregard not perceived this growing sensitiveness, and had he not also been thoroughly aware that any open interference on his part would bring upon him the censure of the War Department.
3 His letters of November 12th, through his
Chief of Staff, and of November 15th, written by himself, show what caution and considerateness he used towards the
Commander of the army, and how far from his thought it was to overshadow him in any way.
4 But, in his opinion,
General Hood's preparations for the offensive were so slow and hesitating as to jeopardize the object of the campaign; and he therefore, in all his interviews with
General Hood, urged the necessity of an immediate advance and greater rapidity in the movements of the troops.
His intention, as he distinctly stated, was not to remain with or accompany the army, but merely to see it safely across the
Tennessee and on the move forward.
For it must be remembered that other important matters claimed his attention, in
General Taylor's Department, along the
Mississippi River, where the enemy appeared to be moving his forces towards
Memphis and
Paducah.
An early attack on
Corinth was