He is by no means confident of the determination to which that convention will ultimately come, but thinks that a delay has been gained which will carry us over the 4th of March in safety. Mr. Adams and Mr. Seward, with both of whom I have had long conversations, agree with Mr. Sumner fully as to any danger of an immediate attack. Mr. Seward thinks all danger is past. Mr. Sumner thinks Mr. Seward has never been aware of the real peril; and is evidently of the opinion that the crisis is only postponed. Mr. Adams thinks there will be no need of troops before the 6th of March, but thinks we shall have to fight after that date. Mr. Sumner thinks Congress would be now sitting in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, but for General Scott's action. Mr. Seward seems to think this concentration of troops has been unnecessary. General Wilson appears to be of the opinion that Massachusetts and New York will have to furnish money, but doubts if they will be called upon for any troops. Mr. Seward urged me to write to you, and beg you to secure the passage of the resolutions by which Massachusetts would endorse the bonds of the United States to the extent of the deposit of surplus revenue in her hands, made in 1837. He says this is all they now ask of Massachusetts; that she will never have to pay a cent on account of such indorsement, but that the indorsement must be given, as the new Administration will be without funds. I have also conversed with Mr. Burlingame, Mr. Thayer, and Mr. Alley, of Massachusetts, and particularly with Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, the chairman of the committee who have been inquiring into this conspiracy. Mr. Adams, Mr. Burlingame, Mr. Thayer, and Mr. Stanton, all talked the matter over together in my presence; and all were of opinion that no call would be made on Massachusetts before March 4. Mr. Seward is the only one I have seen who stated that he thought all danger was now at an end, owing to the action of Virginia. And even Mr. Seward, at dinner this P. M., at Mr. Adams', stated that the South must succumb, or we should have to exterminate them, or they would have to exterminate us. He thinks the South are anxious to creep out of the movement of their own creation. I have had to give you as rapid a resume of the opinions of these civilians as possible, as I have hardly time to reach the mail. The only point of immediate importance is, that all agree that there is no probability of an immediate call upon us for militia. Mr. Stanton thought, that, if a call were made, it would be for volunteers; and that there would be time to enlist special regiments for the war, as in the Mexican war. After leaving Mr. Sumner, I called on General Scott. He is avowedly very anxious even now, and would
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