so received the piece of iron.
I rolled over on my back surprised.
Several of our fellows stooped over me and asked how badly I was hurt and if they should help me back.
I said I would see, and very, very carefully felt for a wound, but to my great delight could not find one, and so told them, and that they could go on, I could get along all right.
Except a numbness and a bad bruise, I was unhurt and soon got over it. I was somewhat lame, but managed to keep on the march, getting to our camp by the roadside shortly after the regiment.
Our total losses of the day were two men killed, and one officer and 12 men severely wounded, several having slight wounds not being reported.
As I remember, Charles Carmody
was the only seriously wounded man from our company.”
There is no doubt that the crisis of this battle was the check given to the charge of Rodes
' division of the Confederate army, upon the left of the 19th Corps.
had succeeded in driving through to the head of the ravine from which the road debouches, the army of Sheridan
would have been cut in two, and the result would have been disastrous at that stage of the battle.
's quick perception of the danger and his prompt disposition of the brigade and especially of the 121st New York not only checked the advance of the charging column, but also threw them into such confusion that they did not recover from it during the rest of the conflict.
Due credit was given to General Upton
, and the 121st New York in the official report of the battle.
, in his Pictorial History of the Civil War
, gives the credit to General Emory
instead of Upton
and to 131st New York instead of to the 121st New York.
The death of General Rodes
at this crisis of the battle was a severe blow to the Confederates
, as was