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 did as he had done before, particularly at the battle of Fair Oaks. He struck a portion of the Union army, temporarily isolated, and he hoped to crush it before our troops could be brought back. It appeared to me that the ground chosen by Hampton, which Johnston occupied the morning of the 19th, substantially along the Clinton road, with high ground and a good artillery position west of it at right angles to Slocum's road of approach, could not have been better selected. Hampton says: “The plan proposed was that the cavalry should move out at daylight and occupy the position held by them on the previous evening. The infantry could then be deployed, putting one corps across the main road and the other two obliquely in echelon to the right of the first.” Hampton's cavalry, after checking Slocum's advance as long as practicable, was to fall back through intervals in Bragg's line and pass off to the right of the troops and guard that flank. Carlin's division (Fourteenth Corps), heading Slocum's column quite early on the morning of March 19th, was moving on toward Bentonville in column, having out in his front and on his flank the usual skirmish line. The enemy's cavalry appeared at first to be more stubborn than usual; so much so that Carlin deployed his division to the left and Corps Commander Davis ordered Morgan to deploy his division so as to cover Carlin's right. This deployment was intended to force back the Confederate cavalry, or (if they were there) to develop infantry and artillery. It was this force which pressed Hampton's cavalry so hard that it hastened back to perform its allotted work; then, Hampton
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